Development of Space Weather Reasonable Worst-Case Scenarios for the UK National Risk Assessment by Hapgood, Mike et al.
Confidential manuscript submitted to Space Weather 
 
Development of Space Weather Reasonable Worst-Case Scenarios for the UK 1 
National Risk Assessment 2 
Mike Hapgood
1






, Paul S. Cannon
2
, Clive 3 
Dyer
5,7






, Richard A. Harrison
1
, Colin 4 
Hord
9
, Richard B. Horne
10






















, Alan W.P. Thomson
17
, James A. Wild
18




RAL Space, STFC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, Harwell Campus, Didcot, Oxfordshire, 8 
OX11 0QX, UK. 9 
2
School of Engineering, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK 10 
3
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Intelligence Innovation, RAF Wyton, 11 
Huntingdon, PE28 2EA, UK 12 
4
Met Office, FitzRoy Road, Exeter, Devon, EX1 3PB, UK 13 
5
Surrey Space Centre, Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of 14 
Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 15 
6
Spire, 45 Finnieston Street, Unit 5A, Sky Park 5, Glasgow G3 8JU, UK 16 
7
CSDRadConsultancy Ltd, Fleet UK 17 
8
Imperial College, Space and Atmospheric Physics, The Blackett Laboratory, Imperial College 18 
London, London SW7 2AZ 19 
9
Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Beehive Ring Road, Crawley, West Sussex, RH6 20 
0YR, UK 21 
10
British Antarctic Survey, High Cross, Madingley Road, Cambridge, CB3 0ET, UK 22 
11
SolarMetrics ltd., UK 23 
12
Centre for Space, Atmospheric and Oceanic Science, University of Bath, Claverton Down, 24 
Bath, BA2 7AY, UK 25 
13
Department of Sociology, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, UK 26 
14
British Geological Survey, Environmental Science Centre, Nicker Hill, Keyworth, Nottingham, 27 
NG12 5GG, UK 28 
15
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Portsdown West, Fareham, PO17 6AD, UK 29 
16
PHE Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards, Harwell Campus, Didcot, 30 
Oxfordshire, OX11 0RQ, UK 31 
17
British Geological Survey, The Lyell Centre, Research Avenue South, Edinburgh, EH14 4AP, 32 
UK 33 
18
Department of Physics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YB, UK 34 
19
UK Space Agency, Polaris House, North Star Avenue, Swindon SN2 1SZ, UK 35 
  36 
Confidential manuscript submitted to Space Weather 
 
Corresponding author: Mike Hapgood (mike.hapgood@stfc.ac.uk)  37 
 38 
 39 
Key Points: 40 
 Reasonable worst-case scenarios have been developed to support assessment of severe 41 
space weather within the UK National Risk Assessment 42 
 Individual scenarios focus on space weather features that disrupt a particular national 43 
infrastructure, e.g. electric power or satellites 44 
 Treat these scenarios as an ensemble, enabling planning for a severe space weather event 45 
within which many of these features will arise 46 
 47 
  48 
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Abstract 49 
Severe space weather was identified as a risk to the UK in 2010 as part of a wider review of 50 
natural hazards triggered by the societal disruption caused by the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull 51 
volcano in April of that year. To support further risk assessment by government officials, and at 52 
their request, we developed a set of reasonable worst-case scenarios and first published them as a 53 
technical report in 2012 (current version published in 2020). Each scenario focused on a space 54 
weather environment that could disrupt a particular national infrastructure such as electric power 55 
or satellites, thus enabling officials to explore the resilience of that infrastructure against severe 56 
space weather through discussions with relevant experts from other parts of government and with 57 
the operators of that infrastructure. This approach also encouraged us to focus on the 58 
environmental features that are key to generating adverse impacts. In this paper, we outline the 59 
scientific evidence that we have used to develop these scenarios, and the refinements made to 60 
them as new evidence emerged. We show how these scenarios are also considered as an 61 
ensemble so that government officials can prepare for a severe space weather event, during 62 
which many or all of the different scenarios will materialise. Finally, we note that this ensemble 63 
also needs to include insights into how public behaviour will play out during a severe space 64 
weather event and hence the importance of providing robust, evidence-based information on 65 
space weather and its adverse impacts. 66 
Plain Language Summary 67 
 68 
Severe space weather was identified as a risk to the UK in 2010 as part of a wider review of 69 
natural hazards following the societal disruption that arose when airspace was closed in April 70 
2010 due to volcanic ash. To support further risk assessment by government officials, we 71 
developed a set of scenarios, each focused on how severe space weather conditions could disrupt 72 
a particular national infrastructure, e.g. the impact of large rapid geomagnetic field changes on 73 
the power grid. These scenarios enabled officials to discuss infrastructure resilience against 74 
space weather with relevant experts in government and industry. In this paper, we outline the 75 
scientific evidence that we have used to develop these scenarios, and the refinements made to 76 
them as new evidence emerged. We also show how these scenarios may occur close together in 77 
time so that government officials must prepare for the near-simultaneous occurrence of many 78 
different problems during a severe space weather event, including the need to consider how 79 
public behaviour will play out during a severe space weather event. This highlights the 80 
importance of providing robust, evidence-based information on space weather and its adverse 81 
impacts. 82 
  83 
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1 Introduction 84 
The past decade has seen increased awareness of the need for societal resilience against the full 85 
range of natural hazards that can seriously disrupt everyday life. A key trigger for this was the 86 
2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. The ash clouds from this Icelandic volcano drifted over much 87 
of Northern Europe, triggering a shutdown of air space for several days, leading to widespread 88 
disruption of air transport, overloading of ground transport, and economic disruption within and 89 
beyond Europe (Oxford Economics, 2010). Within the UK, the subsequent reviews quickly 90 
identified that these adverse impacts would have been much less if pre-existing scientific 91 
knowledge had been factored into the National Risk Assessment process (some background on 92 
this process is provided in the Supplementary Information, together with a summary of non-93 
malicious risks considered in the Assessment, including space weather and pandemic disease). 94 
Those reviews also opened up a key question: were there any other unassessed natural hazards 95 
for which there is credible scientific evidence of potential to cause severe societal and economic 96 
disruption? This quickly identified space weather (disturbances of the upper atmosphere and 97 
near-space environment that can disrupt technology) as an important issue for the UK National 98 
Risk Assessment process (Cabinet Office, 2012) and initiated the development of a set of  99 
“reasonable worst-case scenario” (RWCSs) for use in the assessment process. To facilitate that 100 
development an independent expert group, the Space Environment Impacts Expert Group 101 
(SEIEG), was set up in the autumn of 2010 and has also provided support for related activities 102 
such as exercises to explore how to manage severe space weather events. This paper provides 103 
scientific background to the work undertaken by SEIEG to develop the risk scenarios. 104 
1.1 Background: delivering the RWCS to Government 105 
The RWCS has been an evolving series of technical reports with three versions formally 106 
published since this work started in 2010 (Hapgood et al., 2012, 2016, and 2020). All are openly 107 
available on-line, and structured to address the needs of government officials. Those officals 108 
need concise information on the severe space weather conditions that may disrupt critical 109 
national infrastructures (Cabinet Office, 2019). These infrastructures include the power grid, 110 
transport (aviation, rail), and satellite applications such as Global Navigation Satellite Systems 111 
(GNSS) and communications. They also include generic capabilities such as the electronic 112 
control systems that are now ubiquitous in everyday life, not least in the critical infrastructures 113 
that sustain that life. As a result each of the technical reports provides a set of RWCSs, each 114 
summarising the severe space weather conditions relevant to a particular aspect of critical 115 
infrastructures. Most importantly, we identify which environmental parameters are crucial to the 116 
adverse impacts of space weather on a particular infrastructure, given our appreciation of how 117 
space weather impacts engineered systems (e.g. see Cannon et al., 2013), and also of the 118 
potential societal impacts (e.g. Sciencewise, 2015). Thus each infrastructure-specific RWCS 119 
provides a concise summary of:  120 
 a rationale for the choice of each environmental parameter, including a summary of 121 
anticipated effects on systems at risk from severe values of that parameter;  122 
 our assessment of the reasonable worst case values for that parameter, typically 123 
conditions that may occur about once per century, a benchmark that is widely used in risk 124 
assessment by governments (Hapgood, 2018). But rarer events are considered where they 125 
may lead to catastrophic impacts, e.g. risks to the operation of nuclear power systems 126 
(HSE, 1992).  127 
Confidential manuscript submitted to Space Weather 
 
 the spatial and temporal scales over which severe conditions are thought to manifest; 128 
 the provenance of information on severe conditions, with priority given to sources in the 129 
peer-reviewed literature; 130 
 our assessment of the quality of this information, and where more work may improve that 131 
quality. We emphasise that each RWCS is an interpretation of existing scientific 132 
literature, and is open to revision as additional scientific knowledge becomes available. 133 
This RWCS format was developed in consultation with officials from the UK Government’s 134 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat. It gives our government colleagues a concise document that they 135 
can use when engaging with public and private sector organisations that operate critical 136 
infrastructures affected by space weather. As we note above, the latest RWCS report is openly 137 
available on-line and we encourage readers to use that as the primary source. To assist readers, 138 
we provide cross-references to key RWCS sections at appropriate points in later sections of this 139 
paper. We do not repeat or summarise the RWCS here as it is important that we avoid creating a 140 
secondary source.  141 
1.2 Purpose of this paper 142 
The aim of the present paper is to provide the space weather community with insights into how 143 
we developed the technical content of the most recent RWCS reports, though there is significant 144 
overlap with the two previous RWCS reports since this development is an evolutionary process 145 
that responds to advances in scientific understanding. One major example over the period since 146 
the first RWCS report has been the growing set of evidence on historical radiation storms, 147 
notably the 774/5 AD event first reported by Miyake et al (2012). Subsequent papers including 148 
Mekhaldi et al. (2015), Dyer et al. (2017), O’Hare et al. (2019) and Miyake et al. (2020)) have 149 
expanded our understanding of these extreme events and their implications for the RWCSs on 150 
systems affected by space and atmospheric radiation environments. 151 
In the rest of this paper, we first present the details behind the infrastructure-specific RWCSs, 152 
and then explore how the individual RWCSs may arise in parallel during a severe space weather 153 
event. This parallelism has been an important consideration for us as a severe space weather 154 
event will cause problems in different economic sectors close together in time. It is one of the 155 
factors that drives the ranking of space weather as a significant risk in the UK National Risk 156 
Register. Thus our work has to capture both the detail (which is important for dealing with 157 
specific economic sectors) and the potential for diverse problems to occur close together in time. 158 
We group the details into a series of sections. Section 2 discusses the RWCSs for electrically 159 
grounded systems, including electricity transmission networks, pipelines and railway. Section 3 160 
discusses those for ionospheric space weather effects on a wide range of radio applications 161 
including GNSS, high-frequency (HF) radio communications, satellite communications over a 162 
range of frequencies (e.g. VHF, UHF and L-band). Section 4 discusses the RWCSs for satellite 163 
operations including the effects of particle radiation, electrical charging and atmospheric drag, 164 
and outlines the potential impacts on satellite launches, a topic that is becoming important as the 165 
UK develops its own launch capabilities. Section 5 discusses the RWCSs for atmospheric 166 
radiation effects on aviation, and on terrestrial electronics. Section 6 outlines how solar radio 167 
bursts can impact radio technologies including GNSS and radars. The organisation of these 168 
sections reflects our way of working, which emerged from the interplay between science, 169 
engineering and the need to consider impacts on specific infrastructures. For example, it is 170 
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natural to group together all impacts that affect satellite operations since that sector is well-171 
structured to handle risks at both design and operations levels. In contrast the ionospheric effects 172 
on radio systems are grouped across infrastructure sectors since the engineering study of radio 173 
signal propagation works across sectors. In other cases, there is a natural focus around a physical 174 
effect that impacts multiple infrastructures (e.g. electrically grounded systems). This diverse 175 
approach has proved effective in establishing the details of the different RWCSs, allowing us to 176 
address each area of focus as best suits that area; this is reflected in differences of structure 177 
within sections 2 and 6.  178 
The potential for many different space weather effects to occur close together in time is 179 
addressed in Section 7, where we outline how two terrestrial manifestations of space weather 180 
each drive a diverse set of RWCSs. Geomagnetic storms contribute to RWCSs for power grids, 181 
rail systems, GNSS, high-frequency (HF) radio, satellite drag and charging, whilst radiation 182 
storms contribute to RWCSs for satellite operations, aviation, ground systems and HF radio. We 183 
discuss how these two types of storms generate links between RWCSs, links that need to be 184 
appreciated by policy makers and system operators as they cause seemingly different problems 185 
to arise simultaneously. This then leads into Section 8, where we widen our set of scenarios to 186 
discuss the possible effects of severe space weather on public behaviour, taking account of the 187 
links between RWCSs. In the final section, we review the current state of knowledge concerning 188 
severe space weather environments; we identify key areas for improvement, and discuss how 189 
these may be addressed.  190 
1.3 Key drivers of space weather  191 
The focus of this paper is on the space weather environments that most immediately impact the 192 
operation of critical infrastructures. As we will discuss below those impacts can take several 193 
forms including: (a) interactions with hardware and software systems, (b) delay, distortion and 194 
absorption of radio signals during propagation, and (c) human radiation exposure. Thus we focus 195 
mainly on the terrestrial end of the chain of physics by which the Sun generates space weather 196 
phenomena at Earth. But, when needed, we do discuss key solar and heliospheric phenomena. 197 
These include coronal mass ejections (CMEs), high speed streams (HSSs) and stream interaction 198 
regions (SIRs), as solar wind features that drive geomagnetic activity (both storms and 199 
substorms) and radiation belt activity (especially enhanced fluxes of high-energy electrons), (b) 200 
solar flares, as the causes of dayside radio blackouts, and (c) solar energetic particles (SEPs) 201 
which may be energised in a solar flare reconnection event or a CME-driven shock near the Sun. 202 
Solar energetic particle (SEP) events have a direct impact on the Earth and near-Earth 203 
environment as they have an immediate impact on satellite operations, as well being the driver of 204 
atmospheric radiation storms. Similarly we directly consider solar radio bursts as they have an 205 
immediate effect on some radio receiver systems. 206 
Geomagnetic activity arises when CMEs and SIRs arrive at Earth. If these are preceded by a 207 
shock, their arrival can produce a rapid compression of the magnetosphere, which is observed on 208 
ground as a sharp increase in the strength of the magnetic field, typically by a few tens of nT, 209 
known as a sudden impulse. If followed by a geomagnetic storm, it is also termed a sudden storm 210 
commencement. If the CMEs and SIRs contain a southward magnetic field (opposite to the 211 
northward field in Earth’s magnetosphere) solar wind energy and momentum can flow into 212 
Earth’s magnetosphere, via magnetic reconnection. This inflow can drive a circulation of plasma 213 
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and magnetic flux with the magnetosphere, known as the Dungey cycle, in which energy is 214 
temporarily stored in the tail of the magnetosphere and then released in bursts that we term 215 
substorms. These can produce bursts of electric currents in the ionosphere at high, and 216 
sometimes mid, latitudes, and injections of charged particles into the ring current, the torus of 217 
electric current that encircles the Earth around 10000-20000 km above the equator. Changes in 218 
these currents manifest on the ground as variations in the surface geomagnetic field, and are a 219 
key driver of the geomagnetic induced currents discussed in section 2. If CMEs and SIRs can 220 
drive an extended period of geomagnetic activity, often with examples of all these geomagnetic 221 
phenomena, it is termed a geomagnetic storm and is typically characterised by the build-up of the 222 
ring current to high levels. 223 
Geomagnetic activity also has profound and complex impacts on the upper atmosphere, both the 224 
thermosphere and ionosphere. For example the heating of the polar thermosphere during 225 
geomagnetic activity drives changes in global pattern of thermospheric winds, and also an uplift 226 
of denser material from the lower thermosphere – leading to changes in composition and density 227 
of the thermosphere, which affect satellite operations as discussed in more detail in section 4.2.  228 
These changes in the thermosphere drive further changes in density of the ionosphere, for 229 
example by changing the rate at which ionisation is lost by dissociative recombination. These 230 
storm effects in the ionosphere, and their impacts on radio systems, are discussed in more detail 231 
in sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.2. The ionosphere is also affected by SEPs and solar flares. Both 232 
can produce ionisation at altitudes below 90 km, leading to the absorption of HF and VHF radio 233 
waves as discussed in section 3.4.1; high energy electron precipitation during geomagnetic 234 
activity also contributes to this low altitude ionisation, and the associated radio wave absorption. 235 
SEPs also have significant impacts on satellites. As discussed in section 4.1, charged particles at 236 
energies above 1 MeV can penetrate into satellite systems, causing radiation damage (the 237 
displacement of nuclei within the material structure of those systems) and single event effects 238 
(SEEs). The latter arise from the generation of ionisation within electronic devices leading to a 239 
range of adverse effects including the flipping of computer bits in memory (single event upsets), 240 
and the generation of electron cascades that damage parts or all of those devices (single gate 241 
rupture and burnout); see Box 2 of Cannon et al. (2013) for an overview of the wider range of 242 
SEEs.  SEPs can also penetrate deep into Earth’s atmosphere where they collide with 243 
atmospheric species to produce enhanced levels of radiation in the form of neutrons and muons. 244 
The enhanced atmospheric radiation can have adverse impacts on electronic systems and human 245 
health as discussed in section 5. 246 
Finally we note that our remit is to address space weather as a natural hazard (and hence as a 247 
“non-malicious risk” within the UK National Risk Assessment). We do not address 248 
anthropogenic processes that can generate space weather effects (Gombosi et al., 2017), but do 249 
note where such effects (e.g. artificial radiation belts) provide helpful insights for our 250 
understanding of naturally occurring space weather. 251 
1.4 Notes on nomenclature 252 
To ensure consistency across the wide range of space weather events and data presented in this 253 
paper, we have adopted the following conventions: 254 
 The Carrington event of 1859. We recognize that this severe space weather event is 255 
sometimes called the Carrington-Hodgson event to reflect that the initial flare was observed 256 
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simultaneous by two respected observers in different parts of London (Carrington, 1859; 257 
Hodgson, 1859). For simplicity, we refer to it as the Carrington event in the rest of this paper. 258 
 We sometimes use the older term co-rotating interaction region (CIR) alongside the modern 259 
term stream interaction region. A CIR is a special case in which an SIR persists for more than 260 
a synodic solar rotation period of 27 days, and hence will impact Earth repeatedly at 27-day 261 
intervals, perhaps for several months. We use the two terms here to recognize that both are 262 
still widely used in the expert community. 263 
 Particle fluxes are presented in areal units of cm-2 rather than m-2, as would follow from a 264 
strict application of SI units. We do this to recognize that most radiation experts are more 265 
used to using cm
-2
. 266 
 Aircraft flight altitudes are presented in units of feet in line with international aviation 267 
practice; we also provide kilometres in parentheses, when a value in feet is first presented. 268 
2 Geomagnetically induced currents 269 
Here we discuss impacts of GIC on electricity transmission, pipeline and rail networks. This 270 
underpins a number of RWCSs as discussed in Hapgood et al. (2020): section 7.1 for power grids 271 
and section 7.14 for railway signal systems. It is not currently clear if we need RWCSs for 272 
pipelines and railway electric traction systems.  273 
2.1 Introduction 274 
Rapid, high amplitude magnetic variations during magnetic storms induce a geoelectric field, E, 275 
in the conducting Earth, and in conductors at the Earth’s surface. This E-field causes electrical 276 
currents - Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC) - to flow in conducting structures grounded 277 
in the Earth (e.g. Boteler, 2014). GICs are therefore a potential hazard to industrial networks, 278 
such as railways, metal oil and gas pipelines, and high voltage electrical power grids, during 279 
severe space weather.   280 
The GIC hazard can be assessed using the time rate of change of the vector magnetic field in the 281 
horizontal plane (dBH/dt) or the induced E-field as the key parameter. In the UK, E-fields are 282 
spatially complex, due to the conductivity and structure of the underlying geology, and of the 283 
surrounding seas (e.g. Beggan et al., 2013). High values of dBH/dt generally occur as short bursts 284 
due to rapid changes in ionospheric and magnetospheric current systems, and are most common 285 
during geomagnetic storms due to phenomena such as substorms, sudden commencements, or 286 
particle injections into the ring current. The largest recorded disturbance of the last 40 years in 287 
Europe, in terms of dBH/dt, was 2,700 nT min
-1
, measured in southern Sweden in July 1982 288 
(Kappenman, 2006), while the largest UK dBH/dt was 1,100 nT min
-1
 in March 1989 (e.g. as 289 
shown in Figure 6 of Thomson et al., 2011, see also in the Supplementary Information), both 290 
during substorms. Extreme value statistical studies (Thomson et al., 2011; Rogers et al., 2020) 291 
suggest that, for the UK, the largest dBH/dt is of the order of several thousand nT min
-1
. Taking 292 
the worst-case as the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval on the predicted extreme values, 293 
these studies suggest that the worst-case dBH/dt in one hundred years is 4,000 to 5,000 nT min
-1
 294 
(rising to 8,000 to 9,000 nT min
-1
 for the two-hundred year worst case). However, there remains 295 
considerable uncertainty in these estimates and further research is required, e.g. to fully 296 
understand the occurrence of large, but short-lived, excursions in dBH/dt, such as in the 1982 and 297 
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1989 observations above, also examples reported during the severe storms in May 1921 298 
(Stenquist, 1925) and October 2003 (Cid et al., 2015). Local peak electric fields of ~20-25 V/km 299 
have been estimated for the largest events such as the Carrington Storm of 1859 (e.g. Pulkkinen 300 
et al., 2015; Ngwira et al., 2013; Beggan et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2017). These intense events 301 
may have spatial scales of several hundred km (Ngwira et al., 2015; Pulkkinen et al., 2015). 302 
Thus a single event, essentially a 1-2 minute duration ‘spike’ in dBH/dt or E during a magnetic 303 
storm, could simultaneously cover a sizeable fraction of the UK landmass. 304 
The probability of occurrence of these intense localised disturbances is largely determined by the 305 
frequency of severe geomagnetic storms, as such storms can produce multiple bursts of large 306 
dBH/dt at different times and longitudes, as occurred during the 1989 storm (Boteler, 2019), and 307 
even repeated large bursts a day or more apart at the same location as occurred in Sweden during 308 
the May 1921 storm (Hapgood, 2019a). The likelihood of repeated intense events at any 309 
particular location over a few days is a significant hazard during the most severe storms (see 310 
table IV of Oughton et al, 2019). 311 
The overall magnitude of severe storms is characterised by large negative values of the hourly 312 
disturbance storm time, Dst, magnetic activity index. But this is a measure of the total intensity 313 
of the ring current, not of dBH/dt. The ring current builds up during intense magnetic activity, but 314 
decays only slowly, often producing the largest negative value of Dst some hours after bursts of 315 
large dBH/dt, e.g. the 1989 UK large dBH/dt disturbance above occurred around four hours before 316 
minimum Dst. Thus we focus here on Dst as a tool to assess the frequency of severe geomagnetic 317 
storms. Examples of such storms include the Carrington event and the May 1921 storms for 318 
which recent estimates of minimum Dst are around -900 nT (Cliver and Dietrich, 2013; Love et 319 
al, 2019); the spectacular storm of September 1770 (Kataoka & Iwahashi, 2017, Hayakawa et al., 320 
2017) is probably also in this category. The recurrence likelihood of such storms has been the 321 
subject of several studies (Riley, 2012; Love, 2012; Riley and Love, 2017; Jonas et al., 2018; 322 
Chapman et al., 2020; Elvidge, 2020), all which suggest that we should expect to experience 323 
such severe storms on centennial timescales. 324 
To further improve the certainty of what may be considered a reasonable worst-case scenario 325 
and its impacts, we require independently-derived estimates of extremes, in both amplitude and 326 
in space/time profile, of the E-field and of dBH/dt, together with better models of ground 327 
conductivity and the flow of GIC in conducting networks (e.g. Pulkkinen et al., 2017). 328 
2.2 Electrical transmission and pipeline networks 329 
The consequences of severe space weather for the power transmission system include: tripping 330 
of safety systems potentially leading to regional outages or cascade failure of the grid; 331 
transmission system voltage instability and voltage sag; premature ageing of transformers 332 
leading to decreased capacity in months/years following an event (Gaunt, 2014); and physical 333 
damage, e.g. insulation burning, through transformer magnetic flux leakage. According to the 334 
executive summary of the report by Cannon et al. (2013), in response to a 1 in 100-200 year 335 
reasonable worst-case event of 5,000 nT min
-1
, “… around six super grid transformers in 336 
England and Wales and a further seven grid transformers in Scotland could be damaged … and 337 
taken out of service. The time to repair would be between weeks and months. In addition, current 338 
estimates indicate a potential for some local electricity interruptions of a few hours. … National 339 
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Grid’s analysis is that around two nodes in Great Britain could experience disconnection”. The 340 
report later notes that there are over 600 nodes in Great Britain, so the loss of power for an 341 
extended period would be limited to a few areas, but would be a severe emergency in those 342 
areas. Historical occurrences of dBH/dt > ~500 nT min
-1
 have been associated with enhanced risk 343 
to the UK grid (e.g. as documented in Erinmez et al., 2002). Modelled GIC for a 5,000 nT min
-1
 344 
dBH/dt, suggest a per-substation GIC of hundreds of Amps, depending on substation and 345 
electrojet locations (Beggan et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2017). Figure 1 shows modelled maxima 346 
GIC across the UK for the less severe 1989 storm, according to Kelly et al. (2017).  347 
GICs induced by space weather can interfere with the operation of cathodic protection systems 348 
on pipeline networks, disrupting the control of those systems and leading to enhanced corrosion 349 
rates (Gummow, 2002; Ingham and Rodger, 2018). This impact arises where the induced pipe-350 
to-soil potential (PSP), associated with GICs and induced by the E-field, lies outside the normal 351 
operational limits (of order -1V with respect to Earth) of cathodic protection systems (e.g. 352 
Boteler, 2000). To date, in the UK there has been no (or no publicly available) assessment of the 353 
space weather hazard to the high-pressure gas transmission system, though interference with 354 
cathodic protection systems in Scotland was noted during the March 1989 storm (Hapgood, 355 
private communication). However, Boteler (2013) describes measured and modelled PSP data 356 
for North American pipelines, demonstrating that tens of Volts of PSP are feasible for E-fields of 357 
order 1V/km, particularly at pipe ends and at electrically insulated pipe junctions, in pipes of 358 
several hundred km extent. Thomson et al. (2005) estimated that peak UK E-fields reached ~5 359 
V/km during the October 2003 storm, which suggests that UK pipelines, like those in North 360 
America, are likely to experience anomalous levels of PSP during severe events. 361 
2.3 Rail networks 362 
Railway infrastructure and operations can be affected by induced electrical currents during 363 
severe space weather (e.g. Krausmann et al., 2015). Studies of railway operations at magnetic 364 
latitudes above 50° (Wik et al., 2009; Eroshenko et al., 2010) have shown that induced and/or 365 
stray currents from the ground during strong magnetic storms result in increased numbers of 366 
signalling anomalies. Although most such anomalies result in a right-side failure, i.e. a fail-safe 367 
situation in which signals incorrectly stop trains, a recent detailed analysis by Boteler (2020) 368 
shows that both right- and wrong-side failures are possible. In the latter case signals incorrectly 369 
allow trains to enter an already occupied section of track, thus creating a collision risk. A space-370 
weather impact study commissioned by the UK Department for Transport (Atkins, 2014) reports 371 
that induced direct current flowing in the overhead line equipment could cause a train’s on-board 372 
transformer to overheat and shut down, while interference with on-board line current (fault) 373 
monitoring could also stop train movement. The extent to which track-staff workers are 374 
vulnerable to induced currents in cables and track is also unclear, suggesting that maintenance 375 
might need to be suspended during severe space weather. The UK railway network relies upon 376 
many modern technologies (including power, communications and GNSS), so a set of complex 377 
interdependencies arise and introduce vulnerabilities beyond those associated with individual 378 
direct impacts on railway infrastructure. Whilst power supply failures would severely degrade 379 
signalling operations, meanwhile, the unavailability of GNSS services would impact many non-380 
safety critical railway systems, with the potential to lead to significant disruption. The study by 381 
Atkins (2014) notes that GSM-R (“Global System for Mobile Communications – Railway”, now 382 
the primary communication system on UK railways), may be affected by solar radio bursts 383 
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around sunrise and sunset (due to the directional antennas used by GSM-R), again leading to a 384 
loss of service and disruption to the network. Although these impacts are described here 385 
independently, the greatest uncertainty (and risk of disruption and safety issues) arises from the 386 
interconnectivity of these systems and from impacts arising from multiple, simultaneous space-387 
weather effects. As noted by Atkins (2014), accidents are rarely caused by a single failure; 388 






Figure 1: The maximum GIC experienced at each 395 
node/substation in the UK transmission system at 396 
any time during the March 1989 magnetic storm, 397 





3 Ionospheric impacts on radio systems 403 
Here we discuss how radio signals propagating through the ionosphere are affected by space-404 
weather-driven changes in the structure of the ionosphere. This underpins a number of RWCSs 405 
as discussed in Hapgood et al. (2020): section 7.11 which discusses how ionospheric scintillation 406 
affects satcom, sections 7.9 and 7.10 which discuss ionospheric effects on GNSS, and sections 407 
7.12 and 7.13 which discuss ionospheric effects on  high frequency radio communications. 408 
3.1 Background: ionospheric storms 409 
The ionosphere varies on timescales ranging from seconds to years. Many of the diurnal and 410 
long-term variations are relatively cyclic and can be well-modelled climatologically. Space 411 
weather describes the irregular changes which are superimposed on this climatology. Large 412 
ionospheric space weather events are termed storms and are driven by solar and heliospheric 413 
phenomena as discussed in section 1.3.   414 
The spatial and temporal variations of the ionospheric electron density results in variations in 415 
both its local refractive index and the absorption of radio waves. In addition to large-scale 416 
variations are electron density irregularities ranging in size from metres to tens of kilometres. 417 
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These diffract and scatter electromagnetic waves, with the small-scale irregularities causing 418 
amplitude and phase variations known as scintillation. 419 
 420 
Figure 2:  The main ionospheric regions during quiet conditions (F10.7 = 100, Kp = 2) at 00 UT 421 
on 1 September based on the equatorial anomaly description in NeQuick (Nava et al. 2008), the 422 
auroral oval model from Zhang and Paxton (2008) and the ionospheric trough model from 423 
Karpachev et al. (2016) and Aa et al. (2020). 424 
Ionospheric storm impacts show considerable geographic variations. We divide these into several 425 
regions as shown in Figure 2: the high latitude region (including the polar cap, auroral zone and 426 
trough), the mid-latitude region, and the low latitude region (including the equatorial anomalies).  427 
In the high latitude polar cap, ionospheric storms are associated with convection of patches of 428 
enhanced ionization from the dense dayside ionosphere to the less dense nightside ionosphere. 429 
These patches are associated with strong gradients and irregularities (Weber et al., 1984).  430 
At auroral latitudes geomagnetic storms manifest as a series of substorms as energy is released 431 
from the tail of the magnetosphere. Enhanced particle precipitation into the D, E and F-regions 432 
occurs and strong electric fields drive plasma instabilities. Together, these cause electron density 433 
gradients, irregularities, and new ionospheric layers in the night time E and F regions, and 434 
enhanced ionization in the D-region in both the midnight and morning sectors (see section 3.4.1 435 
for more detail). During large storms, the auroral ionosphere expands and shifts to lower 436 
latitudes. Observations of the visual aurora during the Carrington event indicates that the auroral 437 
ionosphere can expand to lower latitudes on multiple nights during a severe space weather event 438 
(Green and Boardsen, 2006).   439 
Ionospheric storms at mid-latitudes often start with a positive phase of enhanced electron density 440 
lasting a few hours, associated with the sudden commencement signature of the geomagnetic 441 
storm. This is followed by a negative phase with decreased electron density, lasting several days 442 
associated with the geomagnetic main phase (e.g., Matsushita, 1959). During a severe event, it is 443 
possible that the usual mid-latitude phenomenology will be unrecognizable, with the high 444 
Confidential manuscript submitted to Space Weather 
 
latitude ionosphere moving to lower latitudes and the low latitude ionosphere moving to higher 445 
latitudes, so that they are in relatively close proximity. 446 
Considerable progress has been made in understanding low latitude ionospheric storm processes 447 
in recent years, and it is widely recognized that thermospheric composition, neutral winds and 448 
electrodynamic effects are all important. Notably, near the magnetic dip equator, ionospheric 449 
storms cause enhanced uplift of the ionization to high altitudes, which in turn causes electron 450 
density enhancements in the anomaly regions poleward of the magnetic equator (e.g., Basu et al., 451 
2002; Mannucci et al., 2005). In the same regions Rayleigh-Taylor instabilities can generate 452 
small-scale electron density irregularities in the evening sector (Kintner et al, 2007). During very 453 
large storms, localized storm enhancements form at mid-latitudes and are uplifted to high 454 
altitudes on the dayside (Yin et al., 2006). 455 
In the following sub-sections the rationale for a range of reasonable worse-case ionospheric 456 
parameters are described by reference to the operating requirements of satellite communications, 457 
GNSS, and HF communications. In large part these same ionospheric parameters also define the 458 
reasonable worse-case limitations of a number of other ionospheric radio systems, see for 459 
example Cannon (2009). 460 
3.2 Impacts on Satellite Communications 461 
All communication systems are designed to tolerate variations in the signal amplitude and phase, 462 
but when signal fades are too severe and/or the phase too randomised (as in strong scintillation), 463 
message errors occur. Error correction codes and interleaving can mitigate these problems to 464 
some extent, but these fail if the channel variations are severe.  465 
The effects of scintillation increase as the operating frequency is decreased and consequently, 466 
what is a major event at one frequency is minor at another. Even moderate ionospheric storms 467 
affect satellite communication systems operating between 150 MHz and 500 MHz.  This band 468 
supports military applications, together with a number of civilian systems, including the 469 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) at 162 MHz, the ARGOS remote telemetry system at 402 470 
MHz, search and rescue transponders at 406 MHz and communications to many small satellite 471 
missions. More intense storms can degrade L-band (1-2 GHz) mobile satellite communication 472 
systems (e.g. Iridium and Inmarsat) and may even affect S-band (2-4 GHz) communications. 473 
Higher frequency systems in the C (4-8 GHz), X (8-12 GHz), Ku (12-18 GHz) and higher 474 
frequency bands are unaffected by ionospheric scintillation and may be expected to keep 475 
operating normally during a severe space-weather event. Current satellite TV broadcasting in the 476 
UK uses frequencies in the Ku band. 477 
Comparing the received signal variations, and in particular the fading, at different frequencies is 478 
difficult because of the different techniques and metrics used by different authors (Aarons, 1984; 479 
Basu et al., 1988). However, many measurements have demonstrated that when the scintillation 480 
is intense, the signal amplitude is Rayleigh distributed and this, in turn, implies that the phase is 481 
uniformly distributed over 2. During such periods, the ionospheric coherence bandwidth may 482 
be reduced below the signal bandwidth resulting in distortion of the signal. Cannon et al. (2006) 483 
found that the median UHF coherence bandwidth during a strong scintillation event was 2.1 484 
MHz. It is reasonable to suppose that the coherence bandwidth will be substantially less than this 485 
during a severe event and that systems may experience frequency selective fading. The 486 
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performance of systems not specifically designed to operate under such conditions is likely to be 487 
significantly impaired.  488 
In summary, during the peak of a severe event, some satellite communication signals will 489 
experience Rayleigh amplitude fading, and coherence bandwidths will be less than 2 MHz. Due 490 
to the strength of the turbulence that generates the irregularities, these conditions will likely 491 
prevail from VHF through to S-band. Cannon et al. (2013) judged that scintillation may cause 492 
problems to VHF and UHF links for between one and three days, but this could be longer if 493 
multiple storms occur in succession.  494 
3.3 Impacts on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 495 
GNSS systems operate at frequencies between ~1.1 GHz and ~1.6 GHz and may employ a single 496 
frequency signal (with an associated ionospheric correction model) or signals on two or more 497 
frequencies (where no ionospheric correction model is required). Like satellite communications 498 
systems, single, multi-frequency and differential GNSS operations suffer from the effects of 499 
scintillation. 500 
When just a single frequency is used the signal group delay and phase advance due to the total 501 
electron content (TEC) along the signal path has to be accounted for. The TEC is estimated using 502 
a model and any deviation from that model introduces errors in the receiver position, navigation 503 
and time (PNT) solutions. The model is unlikely to compensate correctly for conditions 504 
experienced during severe space weather and may underestimate or overestimate the true TEC. 505 
Mannucci et al. (2005) measured the vertical TEC observations at similar locations at the same 506 
time of day during the Halloween storms of 2003 finding that the vertical TEC varied from a 507 




). It 508 
follows that during severe space weather the vertical error after ionospheric model correction 509 
will sometimes be well over 100 TECu (equivalent to a range error of 16 m at the GPS L1 510 
frequency). 511 
Small scale horizontal spatial gradients, which will be particularly prevalent during severe space 512 
weather, will be particularly poorly modelled.  These spatial gradients will manifest as temporal 513 
gradients as the satellite being tracked moves, and this will be particularly important in some 514 
differential applications. During large ionospheric storms the spatial ionospheric gradients at 515 
mid-latitudes can cause, at the GPS L1 frequency, excess signal delays, expressed as range 516 
errors, greater than 400 mm km
-1 
between two separated ground receivers (Datta-Barua et al., 517 
2010). The corresponding temporal variation is a function of the satellite velocity, the frontal 518 
velocity of a moving ionospheric gradient and the velocity of the receiver measured relative to 519 
the ionospheric pierce point (IPP). The IPP is the intersection point of a satellite-to-receiver path 520 
with a co-rotating thin shell at a nominal ionospheric altitude, for example at 350 km. For a co-521 
rotating receiver i.e. one that is stationary on the Earth’s surface, the ray path thus moves across 522 
the co-rotating shell as the satellite moves, tracing out a track of IPP locations across the shell, at 523 
a velocity defined by the changing geometry of the ray path. Based on Bang and Lee (2013) a 524 
mid-latitude, large-storm, fixed-receiver IPP velocity of 400 ms
-1
 is reasonable resulting in a 525 
~9.6 m min
-1
 temporal gradient. Given that the Bang and Lee (2013) measurements were made 526 
during storms that were not as large as a Carrington event, we can be confident that the spatial 527 
gradient and their velocities will be higher during a severe event. Consequently, we have chosen 528 
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to double both the aforementioned spatial gradient and IPP velocity for severe storms, to give a 529 
reasonable worst-case spatial gradient of 800 mm km
-1 





 At high latitudes, analysis of data from the 29-30 October 2003 severe storms suggests that 531 
multiple coronal mass ejections on successive days can cause daytime TEC enhancements on 532 
more than one day, and that TEC enhancements on the dayside can be convected across the polar 533 
regions into the night side polar ionosphere, causing night time disruption. These convection 534 
events can also cause significant scintillation of signals from multiple GNSS satellites (De 535 
Francesca et al., 2008).   536 
During the storms of 2003, the GNSS Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which operates 537 
over North America, lost vertical navigation capability for many hours, and the performance of 538 
differential systems was significantly impaired (NSTB/WAAS Test and Evaluation Team, 2004). 539 
Scintillation not only reduces the accuracy of GNSS receiver pseudorange and carrier phase 540 
measurements, but it can also result in a complete loss of lock of the satellite signal. If loss of 541 
lock occurs on sufficient satellites, then the positioning service will also be lost. Conker at al. 542 
(2003) developed a very useful model to describe the effects of ionospheric scintillation on GPS 543 
availability by modelling the receiver performance and combining this with the WBMOD 544 
propagation model climatology to estimate the service availability for various levels of 545 
scintillation. The Conker at al. (2003) model illustrated that severe service degradation can occur 546 
in some regions of the world during highly disturbed periods.  547 
During very severe storms it is reasonable to assume that Rayleigh amplitude signal fading will 548 
prevail on most high latitude and equatorial satellite to receiver paths. However, there will 549 
probably be some less severely affected signal paths as well, enabling a few signals to be tracked 550 
and decoded. As a consequence, and noting that GNSS receiver types vary in their ability to track 551 
the satellite signals in the presence of scintillation, this suggests severely diluted precision or no 552 
positioning service at all. 553 
The available evidence suggests that disruption to availability, accuracy, and reliability of GNSS 554 
will occur during a severe ionospheric storm event over much of the Earth. Errors will occur in 555 
single frequency receivers that rely on an ionospheric model which will be unable to keep up 556 
with the dynamics of the prevailing ionosphere, and differential (i.e. multi-receiver) systems will 557 
be unable to correct for the unusually severe spatial gradients. The impact of scintillation on a 558 
modern multi frequency and potentially multi-constellation GNSS user is unknown, both because 559 
the spatial distribution of irregularities is unknown and because each receiver design has its own 560 
vulnerabilities and strengths. Cannon et al. (2013) judged that instantaneous errors in positioning 561 
of more than 100 m and periodic loss of service, lasting from seconds to tens of minutes, will 562 
occur over several days, affecting both single and multi-frequency receivers..  563 
3.4 Impacts on High Frequency (HF) Radio Communications  564 
High frequency (3-30 MHz) point-to-point communications and broadcasting relies on the 565 
ionosphere to reflect radio signals beyond the horizon. The ionosphere is, however, a dynamic 566 
propagation medium that is highly challenging for HF services even during routine space 567 
weather and more so during severe events. 568 
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The principal civilian user of HF communications is the aviation industry, which employs it for 569 
aircraft flying over areas with limited ground infrastructure, e.g. over oceans. Some countries 570 
(notably the USA and Australia) also make extensive use of HF for emergency communications. 571 
The potential for space weather disruption of aviation and emergency communications by HF 572 
blackout is well illustrated by the very large solar flares of September 2017, when HF 573 
communications in the Caribbean were disrupted whilst emergency managers were attempting to 574 
provide support to the region following destructive hurricanes (Redmon et al., 2018). 575 
For civilian users, HF will inevitably become less significant in future as other technologies, 576 
including satellite-based services, supplement or even displace HF. However, this will be a 577 
gradual process (c. 10-15 years) involving changes to international agreements for flight 578 
information regions, aircraft equipment and aircrew procedures. In the interim, HF remains the 579 
primary tool for rapid voice communications between aircraft and Air Traffic Control centres for 580 
airspace management. Thus, a reasonable worst-case estimate is important as a basis against 581 
which propagation-based mitigation strategies may be judged.  582 
3.4.1 Blackout of high frequency radio communications 583 
Polar Cap Absorption (PCA) Events. A PCA event results from ionisation of the polar D-584 
region ionosphere by SEPs. Ionisation is caused principally by particles with energies between 1 585 
and 100 MeV which start arriving at the Earth within tens of minutes to a few hours (depending 586 
on their energy).  Whilst the geomagnetic field shields such particles at low and mid-latitudes, 587 
they precipitate into the entire polar cap ionosphere, enhancing the D-region ionisation which 588 
leads to significant levels of HF radio absorption (PCA).  SEPs associated directly with 589 
impulsive X-ray flares, with no CME, produce narrow particle beams that intersect the Earth and 590 
cause PCA for only a few hours (Reames, 1999). However, SEPs produced by CME-driven 591 
shocks cover a broad range of heliospheric longitudes and their associated PCA may persist for 592 
several days (Reames, 1999; Sauer and Wilkinson, 2008).  In a severe case, in July 1959, the 593 
PCA lasted for 15 days (Bailey, 1964) due to recurrent solar activity. 594 
Riometer measurements of zenithal cosmic noise absorption at 30 MHz at 15 locations in Canada 595 
and Finland during SPEs over solar cycle 23 (1996-2008) typically ranged from 1-5 dB, but 596 
peaked at 19 dB during the severe July 2000 Bastille Day geomagnetic storm. Noting that 597 
dayside PCA events follow an f
-1.5
 frequency dependence (Sauer and Wilkinson, 2008; 598 
Parthasarathy et al., 1963), such an event would attenuate 10 MHz signals by more than 400 dB 599 
(peak) over a 1,000 km point-to-point communications path, rendering communications 600 
impossible. Historical observations near the peak of solar cycle 19 (1954-1964), which notably 601 
had the greatest sunspot number since 1755, showed slightly higher riometer absorption values 602 
of 23.7 dB at 30 MHz (see Table 3 of Bailey (1964)).  603 
During severe space weather, PCAs will be more intense due to an enhanced flux of energetic 604 
particles and the region affected will extend to lower latitudes as the geomagnetic dipole field is 605 
effectively weakened by the magnetospheric ring current that develops over the course of the 606 
geomagnetic storm. Consequently, the absorption values described above can be adopted as a 607 
reasonable worst-case estimate over an enlarged polar cap. 608 
Auroral Absorption (AA). AA is usually confined to geomagnetic latitudes between ~60 and 609 
75 but would be expected to move to lower latitudes and expand during a severe event. Under 610 
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normal conditions, localised (200 by 100 km) absorption regions occur in the midnight sector 611 
during substorms when energetic (>10 keV) electrons are accelerated from the Earth’s 612 
magnetotail along magnetic field lines to the auroral zone ionosphere. This type of AA is 613 
sporadic, with events lasting tens of minutes to an hour (p341, Hunsucker and Hargreaves 2003). 614 
In the morning sector (6-12 MLT), and also under normal circumstances, AA is usually less 615 
localised and more slowly varying (lasting 1-2 hours). It results from a ‘drizzle’ of higher-energy 616 
(tens of keV) electrons from the outer Van Allen belt (Hartz and Brice, 1967). Auroral absorption 617 
rarely exceeds 10 dB on a 30 MHz riometer (p.304, Hunsucker and Hargreaves, 2003; p.333 618 
Davies, 1990) and this value is adopted as a reasonable worst-case value during a severe event. 619 
Sudden Ionospheric Disturbances (SIDs). X-rays associated with solar flares cause an increase 620 
in the electron density of the lower layers of the ionosphere over the entire sunlit side of the 621 
Earth, particularly where the Sun is at a high elevation. A single SID typically lasts 30-60 622 
minutes and can shut down HF communications. During the X45 (Thomson et al, 2004) flare on 623 
4 November 2003 (the largest in the observational record since 1974), the vertical cosmic noise 624 
absorption at the NORSTAR 30 MHz riometer at Pinawa in Manitoba peaked at 12 dB, with 1 625 
dB absorption exceeded for ~45 minutes. Even the latter corresponds to > 20 dB (factor of 100) 626 
of attenuation at 10 MHz over a 1,000 km path which, while significantly less than the 627 
corresponding PCA attenuation, is likely to close most HF communication links which have 628 
insufficient signal-to-noise margin to overcome this loss.  629 
During a severe event, multiple flares will be expected, but the impact of SIDs will be less than 630 
PCA events, because the duration of each event is much shorter (tens of minutes, rather than 631 
hours or even days in the case of PCA events). 632 
3.4.2 Anomalous HF Propagation 633 
In addition to the D-region effects that cause signal absorption, geomagnetic storms cause many 634 
other ionospheric effects particularly in the high and low latitude F-region. In the context of 635 
severe events, these only have practical significance if the absorption does not cause a blackout. 636 
 637 
At mid-latitudes, severe storms cause a significant reduction in the critical frequency of the F2-638 
region, foF2, for periods of up to three days. When this happens the availability of frequencies 639 
reduces, especially during local night-time hours, and as a result of this the likelihood of 640 
interference increases. This long period of reduced foF2 may be preceded by a few hours of 641 
increased foF2 values in the early hours of the storm. 642 
 643 
At high and low latitudes additional reflecting structures, ionospheric gradients and irregularities 644 
occur. These manifest on HF paths as multipath causing frequency selective fading and Doppler 645 
distortion of HF signals. Angling et al. (1998) reported that on HF communications paths across 646 
the disturbed auroral ionosphere, Doppler spreads ranged from 2 to 55 Hz and multipath spreads 647 
ranged from 1 to 11 ms. Cannon et al. (2000) reported similar, but somewhat lower spreads on an 648 
equatorial path in Thailand.  During a severe event, these spreads will likely represent a lower 649 
bound and, because the high latitude ionosphere is likely to have expanded to mid-latitudes and 650 
the equatorial ionosphere also expanded to mid-latitudes, the anomalous propagation paths will 651 
present a major challenge to standard HF communications modems. 652 
 653 
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3.5 Improving our assessments 654 
Estimating the expected ionospheric changes during a severe space weather event is a challenge 655 
and clearly an experimental approach is not possible. Extreme value theory is one technique that 656 
can be employed to extrapolate from minor to major events and has already had some success 657 
(e.g. Elvidge and Angling, 2018). Physics based ionospheric modelling, whereby the physical 658 
drivers such as electric fields, winds and composition are ramped up to values that are 659 
representative of severe storm conditions can also elucidate the likely scenarios (Kintner et al., 660 
2013). 661 
 662 
4 Space weather impacts on satellite operations 663 
Here we discuss how satellite operations are affected by a wide range of space weather effects 664 
including radiation, charging and atmospheric drag. This underpins a number of RWCSs as 665 
discussed in Hapgood et al. (2020): section 7.3 discusses the high energy ion fluxes that produce 666 
Single Event Effects that can disrupt electronic systems; section 7.4 discusses high energy 667 
electron fluxes that cause internal charging leading to discharges inside or close to electronic 668 
systems with the potential to disrupt and damage those systems; section 7.5 discusses 669 
suprathermal electron fluxes that cause surface charging leading to discharges that can generate 670 
false signals; section 7.2 discusses the accumulation of high energy ion and electron fluxes that is 671 
a key driver for radiation damage in electronic components and solar arrays; and section 7.6 672 
discusses the space-weather-driven increases in atmospheric drag that can lower satellite orbits. 673 
We also look towards an RWCS for satellite launches as the UK develops capabilities to launch 674 
satellites from its national territory. 675 
4.1 Impacts of radiation on satellites 676 
4.1.1 Radiation sources 677 
The high-energy radiation environment in space derives from three sources: 678 
• galactic cosmic rays (GCRs) from outside the solar system; 679 
• radiation storms, high fluxes of SEPs accelerated near the Sun; 680 
• radiation belt particles trapped inside the Earth’s magnetic field. 681 
As a result, the space radiation environment contains particles of different types and energies, 682 
and with fluxes varying on timescales from minutes to weeks and longer. This diversity leads to 683 
a wide range of effects on satellites, including single event effects (SEE), surface- and internal- 684 
charging, and also cumulative dose, as outlined below. Satellite designs mitigate these effects up 685 
to levels specified by standards such as ECSS (2008) which are based on observations of 686 
radiation environments during the space age. Therefore, severe events, larger than those 687 
observed during the space age, could exceed the normal design envelopes and push satellites into 688 
uncharted territory. 689 
The critical parameters for this scenario are both the fluxes and fluences of particles: fluxes are a 690 
key environmental parameter to determine immediate or short-term effects such as SEE rates, 691 
whilst fluences (the time integrals of fluxes) are key to assessing cumulative effects such as 692 
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radiation damage. In the following subsections, we discuss the environments for each effect, 693 
broadly in order of the timescales associated with their occurrence (starting with the fastest). 694 
4.1.2 Single Event Effects 695 
These effects are caused by >30 MeV per nucleon particles which can penetrate into the 696 
electronic devices inside spacecraft. The best evidence on the long-term occurrence of extreme 697 
fluxes of very high energy particles comes from cosmogenic nuclides produced when they 698 
interact with Earth's atmosphere, and that are subsequently trapped in dateable natural 699 
environments such as tree rings and ice cores. Measurements of the amounts of nuclides 700 
deposited in these environments enable us to assess the occurrence of extreme events over the 701 
past several thousand years (see also Section 5). Interpolating between these measurements 702 
implies that the 1-in-100 year event could be about 2.4 times more intense than the worst events 703 
of the space age (e.g. October 1989, August 1972). Scaling the Creme96 model (Tylka et al., 704 









, which is reasonably 706 
consistent with models that extrapolate the space age data (Xapsos et al., 2000; Gopalswamy, 707 
2017), as well as the estimate of Cliver and Dietrich (2013) based on scaling via flare intensity. 708 
The practical advantage in using simple scaling factors on the Creme96 model is that this tool 709 
provides methods for estimating SEE rates from both proton interactions and from heavy ions 710 
and is frequently used in satellite design. Peak fluxes are important for assessing the adequacy of 711 
single event upset (i.e. bit changes in memory) mitigation techniques such as Error Detection 712 






for 1-in-100 years, while cumulative 713 
fluences are used to assess hard failure probabilities such as burnout considered over an entire 714 
mission. 715 
4.1.3 Surface Charging 716 
Surface charging is due to low energy plasma interactions with spacecraft surfaces: the relevant 717 
particles have energies up to some 10s of keV. The population is highly dynamic and the severity 718 
of charging depends on multiple environmental parameters and on many details of the 719 
interactions with surfaces. Sporadic measurements of relevant particles including electron fluxes 720 
have been available during the space age from key orbits but the complexity of the surface 721 
charging process means that defining an extreme worst-case environment is not yet possible. 722 
However, we do recognise there is an especially high risk during substorm electron injection 723 
events, when the satellite is in eclipse so there is no photoemission to counter the inflow of 724 
electrons on to satellite surfaces. At present a range of potentially ‘severe’ charging 725 
environments are available in current standards, and literature, e.g. ECSS (2008), NASA (2017), 726 
Deutsch (1982), Mullen et al. (1981), based on observations from the space age. A full analysis 727 
requires the electron spectrum over a range of energies from 100 eV to 100 keV, but Figure 8 of 728 
Fennell et al (2001) indicates that flux enhancements in the energy range 10–100 keV are a key 729 
factor. Mateo-Velez et al (2018) have reviewed these severe environments alongside 16 years of 730 
data at geostationary orbit data: the maximum differential flux at 10 keV found in this work is of 731 










 as shown in their Figure 13, based on severe conditions 732 
reported by Gussenhoven and Mullen (1983).  However, this is not an extreme value analysis, 733 
and therefore the extreme value flux for a 1-in-100 year event could well be much higher. 734 
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Surface charging should be analysed with reference to the full versions of these environments 735 
and standards. 736 
4.1.4 Internal charging 737 
Internal charging is caused by high energy (>100 keV) electrons. Fluxes in specific energy 738 
ranges and in certain orbits have been observed for some decades as discussed in detail below, 739 
and more recently, some direct internal charging current observations have become available, as 740 
also discussed below. Such data have been subject to extreme values analyses in recent times that 741 
provides the basis for our reasonable worst cases for four different orbits as follows: 742 
Geostationary orbit. At geostationary orbit the daily average electron flux greater than 2 MeV 743 

















 at GOES East (Meredith et al., 2015).  These were calculated from an extreme 745 
value analysis of 19.5 years of electron data and exceed, by factors of 7 and 3 respectively, an 746 
earlier calculation (Koons, 2001), as a result of including dead-time corrections in the detector 747 
and considering the two different longitudes of the spacecraft.  We also note that Meredith et al. 748 








at GOES 749 








 at GOES East. We later compare these with simulations of severe 750 
events.  751 
None of these values are directly associated with a particular type of severe event such as a 752 
CME, being simply based on daily averages. It was shown that the maximum flux varies with 753 
longitude due to the difference between the geomagnetic and geographic equator, lower 754 
geomagnetic latitudes yielding higher flux.  As a result, satellites located near 20°E and 160°W 755 
will on average experience local maxima in fluxes, with the latter being the worst-case longitude 756 
overall.  For comparison, the highest observed average electron flux greater than 2 MeV was on 757 
29 July 2004, observed by both GOES East and GOES West, and corresponded to a 1-in-50 year 758 
event. 759 
High fluxes of these electrons typically take the form of bursts that are generated by 760 
magnetospheric processes (Horne et al., 2005) following the arrival of enhanced solar wind such 761 
as a CME or HSS. Simulations for a severe event driven by a CME show that the electron flux 762 
first drops during the main phase of the storm and is then re-formed closer to the Earth. As a 763 
result, it was concluded that the main risk of charging is to satellites in medium and low earth 764 
orbit (Shprits et al., 2011). Recent simulations for a reasonable worst case driven by a HSS 765 
lasting five days or more show that the electron flux can reach the 1-in-150 year event level 766 
stated above and remain high for several days (Horne et al., 2018). Thus, it was concluded that a 767 
HSS event is likely to pose a greater risk to satellites at geostationary orbit than a major CME 768 
driven event. 769 
Medium Earth orbit. The maximum high-energy electron flux in the outer radiation belt varies 770 
with geomagnetic activity but usually lies between 4.5 and 5.0 Re (altitudes 22,300 km–25,500 771 
km). The fluxes are conveniently ordered using the invariant coordinate, L*, developed by 772 
Roederer for radiation belt studies (Roederer, 1970; Roederer and Lejosne, 2018). Lack of data 773 
has restricted extreme value analysis to just one or two locations along the equatorial plane. 774 
Using 14 years of electron data (2002–2016) from the INTEGRAL spacecraft, the 1-in-100 year 775 
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differential electron flux at L* = 4.5, representative of equatorial medium Earth orbit, was found 776 





















 at 2.05 MeV (Meredith et al., 2017).  Note that this is differential and not integral 778 
flux. Although this analysis includes data for more than one solar cycle, geomagnetic activity 779 
was modest compared to previous cycles and may be lower than for a severe event. 780 
An independent extreme value analysis was also performed on charging plate currents measured 781 
by the GIOVE-A spacecraft in a circular orbit with an inclination of 56° (Ryden, 2018).  The 782 
advantage of charging currents is that they can be compared directly against the NASA and ESA 783 
design standards (NASA, 2017; ECSS, 2008).  Only 8 years of data were available for this 784 
extreme value analysis, obtained between 2005 and 2016, but the results yielded a charging plate 785 
current for a 1-in-100 year event of 0.13 pA cm
-2
 (95% confidence interval from 0.045 to 0.22 786 
pA cm
-2
) at L = 4.75 for a charging plate located under 1.5 mm of Al equivalent shielding 787 
(Meredith et al., 2016a).  For this level of shielding the plate current responds to electrons above 788 
1.1 MeV with a peak response between 1.6 and 2.1 MeV.  As noted by Meredith et al. (2016a), a 789 
longer time series is required to improve estimates of the 1 in 100 year plate currents. 790 
Inner radiation belt. Much of the published work in this area has used the McIlwain L value 791 
(McIlwain, 1961; SPENVIS, 2018), rather than Roederer’s L* coordinate noted above. This 792 
work has shown that energetic electrons capable of internal charging can be injected into the 793 
inner radiation belt (1.2 < L < 1.8) and slot region (2.0 < L < 3.0) by rapid compression of the 794 
magnetosphere. The fluxes of such electrons can also be artificially enhanced as a result of high 795 
altitude nuclear detonations.  Observations show that electrons with energies greater than 1.5 796 
MeV were present before such detonations in the 1960s. The resulting artificial radiation belts 797 
decayed slowly but were almost gone by 1968 (West and Buck, 1976a and 1976b). Sufficient 798 
fluxes of energetic electrons were nevertheless present in 2000 to cause internal charging 799 
(Ryden, 2018) but initial observations by the Van Allen Probes (VAP) spacecraft indicated a 800 
virtual absence of the more energetic electrons greater than 900 keV (Fennell, 2015). Temporary 801 
injections have since been observed by VAP (Claudepierre et al., 2017 and 2019), but fluxes are 802 
not yet well determined.  The AE8 (Vette, 1991), AE9 (Ginet et al., 2013), and CRRESELE 803 
(Brautigan and Bell, 1995) models provide the environments for the inner belt but are under 804 
review as the environment is more dynamic than previously thought. Thus this is an area where 805 
further work is required to establish the natural 1-in-100 year event level. That work is now 806 
timely, perhaps urgent, given the growing practical interest in this region, e.g. for electric orbit 807 
raising missions (Horne and Pitchford, 2015). 808 
Low Earth orbit. An extreme value analysis of satellite data at approximately 800 km altitude 809 









 at L* = 3.5.  In general, there is a decreasing trend with increasing L*, with 811 








 (Meredith et al., 2016b). 812 
4.1.5 Cumulative effects 813 
Cumulative dose is due to the integrated fluences of SEPs and trapped environments as discussed 814 
above, and thus depends on the duration of the event. The dose and damage from an SEP event 815 
can accumulate over a day to a week. RWCS fluences are protons, >1 MeV (for solar array 816 
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 (Xapsos et al., 1999; Xapsos et al., 2000). 818 
The enhanced electron flux follows several days after the geomagnetic storm and can accumulate 819 
over several days: a one-week duration was selected for the reasonable worst case.  This 820 






for 1-in-100 year event, based on GOES-821 
West. This is magnetically close to the worst-case longitude of 160°W, where fluences will be 822 
1.11 greater according to the AE8 (Vette, 1991) model and 1.04 according to the AE9 (Ginet et 823 
al., 2013) model. The impact of extreme environments in GEO and MEO and the relative 824 
importance of protons and electrons for various key orbits has recently been considered by 825 
Hands et al. (2018). In interplanetary space, the entire contribution is from solar particles, while 826 
for GEO, electrons are also very significant, and for MEO orbits electrons dominate. Hands et al. 827 
(2018) have also considered the effects on solar arrays for MEO and GEO. 828 
4.2 Atmospheric drag 829 
As previously outlined in Section 3.1, geomagnetic storms, caused by CMEs and SIRs/CIRs, 830 
lead to joule heating and expansion of the polar thermosphere, and associated changes to 831 
thermospheric neutral density. However, during some storms, this heating is limited by enhanced 832 
radiative cooling when intense particle precipitation produces significant levels of NO in the 833 
thermosphere. 834 
The effects of heating quickly spread to all latitudes. Sutton et al. (2009) and Oliveira et al 835 
(2017) reported that the thermosphere response times were 3-4 hours for equatorial regions and 836 
less than 2 hours at other latitudes. Largest density changes are associated with CME-driven 837 
storms, but SIR/CIR-driven storms also lead to large changes in density (Chen et al, 2014; 838 
Krauss et al, 2018). While the solar wind driving associated with a SIR/CIR is weaker than that 839 
associated with a CME, the driving lasts longer, so thermospheric density changes associated 840 
with the arrival of SIRs/CIRs are similar to those for the arrival of all but the largest CMEs. In 841 
addition, SIRs/CIRs are much more prevalent than CMEs during solar minimum, so satellite 842 
operators need to be aware of this risk at this time. Krauss et al (2018) indicate that the larger 843 
density changes typically take place within 1 day following CME arrivals and 1-2 days for 844 
SIR/CIR arrivals. Knipp et al. (2017) showed that shock-led CMEs can lead to enhanced NO 845 
radiative cooling in the thermosphere and a curtailment of the neutral density enhancement, thus 846 
complicating any forecast of this enhancement. 847 
Neutral density changes associated with solar EUV variations also occur. In particular, 848 
enhancement of EUV on timescales of greater than one day, associated with strong solar active 849 
regions, can lead to neutral density increases, for a theoretical worst case, of 105% at 250 km and 850 
165% at 400 km (Reeves et al., 2019). At the same time, transient density increases above quiet 851 
conditions, due to an assumed theoretical maximum solar flare, can be as high as 20% at 200 km, 852 
100% at 400 km, and 200% at 600 km (Le et al., 2016). These theoretical maximum values are 853 
still considerably smaller than the extreme observed and simulated density changes associated 854 
with geomagnetic storms discussed below. Therefore, we will not consider density changes 855 
associated with EUV changes further here. 856 
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Worst-case density changes are reported in analyses of observations from polar orbiting 857 
spacecraft: that by Sutton et al. (2005), who used CHAMP observations during the October 2003 858 
geomagnetic storm, and those by Krauss et al (2015, 2018), who used GRACE and CHAMP 859 
observations from 2003-2015.Thelargest reported density enhancements (at 490 km) are up to 860 




 (absolute). The impact of CIR-driven storms on 861 
density is similar to that of CME-driven storms, if the strongest 10% of the CMEs are excluded. 862 
Krauss et al. (2015, 2018) found high correlations between global neutral density and Dst, the 863 
hourly disturbance storm time index. It is possible to adopt the correlations calculated in Krauss 864 
et al (2015, 2018), and extrapolate to estimate the neutral density change associated with the Dst 865 
estimated for our assumed worst case, the Carrington storm.  However, this is likely to be 866 
questionable because of the relatively large spread in the observations used to calculate the 867 
correlations, because of the limited amount of observations available, and the sensitivity of 868 
results to the period analysed (e.g. Krauss et al (2018) showed different relationships between 869 
Bz, the north-south component of the interplanetary magnetic field, and change in density for 870 
2003-2010 and 2011-2015 periods).  871 
An alternative approach is to model the extreme response. Model simulations of a 1-in-100 year 872 
storm (National Science and Technology Council, 2018) indicate a five-fold increase in neutral 873 
density over the density reported during the October 2003 Halloween storm. Given that the 874 
Halloween storm was around three times stronger than quiet time conditions, this is equivalent to 875 
at least a 15-fold percent increase over quiet time conditions. However, these model results may 876 
suffer from using parametrizations based on observations that do not adequately represent the 877 
most severe conditions.  878 
The Krauss et al. (2018) study benefitted from a recalibration of GRACE and CHAMP data to 879 
ensure the self-consistency of the data, and further re-calibration is required to ensure we can 880 
extend our studies to new datasets (e.g. Swarm). Further exploitation of these satellite 881 
accelerometer data, including assimilation into models, will help to improve the assessment and 882 
understanding of these very strong events on the thermosphere. 883 
Comparison of CHAMP and GRACE data (satellites that flew at around 300-450 km and 400-884 
500 km altitude, respectively) show little variation in relative density changes with height. 885 
However, the reduction in absolute density with height means that drag effects are larger on 886 
CHAMP. Krauss et al. (2018) have assessed drops in satellite altitude following arrival of CMEs, 887 
with the severity of each CME characterised by the minimum value of Bz observed as it passed 888 
the Lagrange L1 point. They found that for severe CMEs (Bz = -45 to -55 nT) the altitude drops, 889 
over a one or two days following CME arrival,  were 90-120 m for CHAMP, but only 40-50 m 890 
for GRACE. Such altitude changes impact satellite orbital tracking. For example, during the very 891 
large geomagnetic storm of 13-14 March 1989, tracking of thousands of space objects was lost 892 
and it took North American Defense Command many days to reacquire them in their new, lower, 893 
faster orbits. Allen et al. (1989) quote that the SMM satellite dropped ½ km at the start of the big 894 
storm and “over 3 miles” (5 km) during the whole period. The drops in orbital altitude can also 895 
lead to premature re-entry for satellites already close to end of life (e.g. the Student Nitric Oxide 896 
Explorer during the 2003 Halloween Storm). Severe space weather makes prediction of both re-897 
entry epochs and conjunctions with other satellites harder, and the latter issue may be worse in 898 
the future with the onset of new multi-satellite constellations.  We need to better understand 899 
implications for satellite tracking. 900 
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4.3 Space launches 901 
This is an area of growing importance for the UK with confirmed plans to build a vertical launch 902 
site in the far north of Scotland and ongoing discussions to develop horizontal launch capabilities 903 
at other UK sites. It is not explicitly included as a topic in the RWCSs as shown in Hapgood et 904 
al. (2020), but will be considered for inclusion in future RWCSs. This will build on the issues 905 
discussed in the previous parts of this section, including: 906 
 The radiation environments that pose a risk to space vehicles during the ascent to orbit 907 
and during early in-orbit operations that are critical to mission success, e.g. solar array 908 
deployment, ejection of shrouds, etc. Risk assessments for space tourist activities may 909 
also need this information. 910 
 The atmospheric drag environment that can disrupt assessment of the achieved orbit and 911 
hence the scheduling of early in-orbit operations. It may also affect the re-entry of 912 
discarded elements of the launch vehicle (upper stages, shrouds, etc.).  913 
5 Space weather and atmospheric radiation 914 
Here we discuss the enhanced levels of atmospheric radiation that can arise from an SEP event 915 
with significant fluxes of particles with energies > 400 MeV, and that can affect operations of 916 
aircraft and of electronic devices on the ground.  This underpins a number of RWCSs as 917 
discussed in Hapgood et al. (2020): section 7.15 discusses the neutron fluxes that can led to 918 
significant rates of single event effects in avionics, section 7.16 which discusses how these 919 
neutron fluxes can accumulate to deliver significant radiation doses to aircrew and passengers; 920 
and section 7.7 which complements section 7.15 by discussing the ground level neutron fluxes 921 
that can led to SEEs in electronic systems on the surface of the Earth. 922 
5.1 Introduction 923 
When high energy particles strike the Earth’s atmosphere they can interact with the nuclei of 924 
oxygen and nitrogen to generate a cascade of secondary particles including neutrons, protons, 925 
electrons and muons. The secondary radiation builds up to a maximum at around 60,000 feet (18 926 
km) and then attenuates down to sea level. This secondary radiation includes both a slowly 927 
changing background due to GCRs and episodic increases when SEP events contain significant 928 
fluxes of very high-energy particles. Secondary radiation from particles with energies above 400 929 
MeV can reach aircraft cruising altitudes and sea level. The latter class of events occurs 930 
approximately once per year and is known as a ground level enhancement (GLE). 931 
The secondary radiation from GCRs is an important practical issue for aviation. However, it is a 932 
continuous effect, slowly changing in response to changes in GCR fluxes as discussed above; 933 
thus we do not consider it as part of this worst-case scenario. Rather, we focus on the enhanced 934 
secondary radiation fluxes generated by SEP events. 935 
5.2 Effects on Civil Aviation 936 
The awareness of the possible impacts on people at aviation altitudes dates to the 1960s 937 
(Foelsche, 1962; Foelsche, 1964, Armstrong et al., 1969), with the emphasis at that time being 938 
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on the development of supersonic passenger travel, because such aircraft would need to fly 939 
higher. However, in the 1960s radiation protection for both workers and the public was in its 940 
relative infancy, with modern style dose limits for people not being introduced until 1977 (ICRP, 941 
1997) with updates following in 1990 (ICRP, 1991) and 2007 (ICRP, 2007). More recently, the 942 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) have made specific 943 
recommendations for air crew (ICRP, 2016).  944 
Since the late 1980s there has also been increasing awareness of the threat posed to electronics 945 
by single event effects (SEEs), caused by the atmospheric radiation environment produced by 946 
galactic cosmic radiation, e.g. (Dyer et al., 1989; Ziegler, 1996; Normand, 1996). Such effects 947 
are identical to those occurring in space systems and are more fully discussed in Cannon et al. 948 
(2013), and in the various standards, e.g. JEDEC(2006) for sea-level soft errors (i.e. SEE-949 
induced changes to data and/or code within electronic devices), and IEC(2016) for effects at 950 
aircraft altitudes. 951 
Early attempts to consider the influence of GLEs, such as Dyer et al. (2003), have recently been 952 
greatly improved (Dyer et al., 2017), by updated modelling of the largest event directly measured 953 
on 23 February 1956 and by generation of the size distribution, using recent events directly 954 
observed since 1942, together with evidence for historic events from cosmogenic nuclides, which 955 
were first noted by Miyake et al. (2012). The early ground monitoring by ionisation chambers 956 
has been reviewed by Shea and Smart (2000), and the first ground level enhancements of 1942 957 
and 1946 were announced by Forbush (1946). Subsequent observations since 1948 were made 958 
using ground-level neutron monitors invented by Simpson, as described in his later review 959 
(Simpson, 2000). By 1956, there were some 17 monitors active when the largest event of modern 960 
times occurred on 23 February 1956 (Rishbeth et al., 2009) (this event will subsequently be 961 
abbreviated as ‘Feb56’), when the maximum measured increase was at Leeds UK, where neutron 962 
fluxes some 50-times greater than background levels were reached within 15 minutes (this was 963 
the time resolution of the monitor at the time).  964 
Before 1942, we have only indirect measurements of cosmic radiation and solar particle events 965 




Cl in ice cores, and 
14
C in tree rings. These results 966 
(Mekhaldi et al., 2015) indicate an event some 30 times greater that the Feb56 GLE in AD774, 967 
and another, 15 times greater than Feb56, in AD994. The nuclides from these events were 968 
detected at enhanced levels in geographically widely dispersed ice core drillings and tree ring 969 




Be imply that these large events had hard spectra, 970 
similar to GLEs in February 1956 and January 2005. Whilst the 1859 event does not show as a 971 
significant feature, there appear to have been some seven events per century in the range 0.5-1 972 
times the Feb56 GLE, between 1800 and 1983 (McCracken and Beer, 2015). The absence of any 973 
cosmogenic nuclide signal from 1859 is probably due to the location of the flare event at 10°W 974 
on the Sun. This is a favourable location for major geomagnetic storms from CMEs, but not for 975 
major particle events that originate further westward (e.g. 80°W for February 1956). 976 
Dyer et al. (2017) provide probability distributions for event sizes using data from Duggal (1979) 977 
and McCracken et al. (2012) combined with cosmogenic nuclide data from Miyake et al. (2012) 978 
and Mekhaldi et al. (2015). The cosmogenic nuclide data and the implications for space weather 979 
effects have recently been extensively reviewed in the book by Miyake et al. (2020). There is 980 
tentative evidence of a turnover for very large events, which is consistent with Usoskin & 981 
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Kovoltsov (2012), who find no evidence for events beyond 50-100 times Feb56. Interestingly, 982 
interpolating between the direct measurements and cosmogenic data suggests that the occurrence 983 
rate of a 2.4 times Feb56 event is around 1 per 100 years, so that although the Carrington event 984 
itself was not very intense at high energies, the use of 2.4 times Feb56, for 1 in 100 year events, 985 
appears reasonable.  986 
In Dyer et al. (2017), the Feb56 GLE was characterised in detail, to serve as a yardstick for 987 
quantifying hazards, based on the Tylka and Dietrich (2009) global average spectrum.   988 
In the RWCS tables in Hapgood et al. (2020) we present secondary particle fluences and dose 989 
equivalent rates in polar regions for events recurring every 100 years, and also every 150 years. 990 
The energy threshold of 10 MeV for neutrons is commonly used in the literature and in standards 991 
as single event effects commonly have cross-sections that plateau above this energy, and fall-off 992 
rapidly below. Protons also give nuclear interactions producing SEEs but with a higher threshold 993 
energy (some 20 MeV). Local conditions (hydrogenous materials) can thermalise the low energy 994 
neutrons and this can greatly enhance SEE rates in certain electronic components that contain the 995 
10
B isotope of boron (20% of naturally-occurring boron). For many modern devices, with very 996 
small feature sizes, direct ionisation by protons and muons can deposit sufficient charge to lead 997 
to SEEs. 998 
The work of Dyer et al. (2017) also presents a worst-case time profile based on the recent work 999 
of McCracken, Shea and Smart (2016) using ionisation chamber data, which had analogue 1000 
outputs and hence improved time resolution compared with the neutron monitors of the time. 1001 
Peak rates are enhanced by about a factor of three, compared with the hourly average rates.  1002 
The influence of radiation dose on crew and passengers should also be considered with regards 1003 
to operational airline planning and public health protection, reflecting the public health principle 1004 
of keeping radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ICRP, 2007; CDC, 2015). For 1005 
instance, an event comparable to Feb56 could give ~7 milliSieverts (Dyer et al., 2017), or 35% 1006 
of the annual dose limit of 20 milliSieverts (ICRP, 2007) used in Europe for aircrew (Euratom, 1007 
1996 and 2013) in a single high latitude 40,000 ft (12 km) altitude flight: this is above the dose 1008 
levels at which airlines sometimes re-roster crew to lower dose activities in order to keep annual 1009 
dose below 6 milliSieverts,  the level at which crew are required to be classified (Air Navigation 1010 
Order, 2019). Classified workers are subject to annual medical examinations and additional 1011 
training requirements, and dose record-keeping, all of which have added cost implications. Dose 1012 
limits do not apply to passengers, but there will be public concern about the receipt of such a 1013 
dose. 1014 
For a 1-in-150 year event, the doses received could reach ~28 milliSieverts (Dyer et al. 2017), 1015 
about 1.4× the occupational dose limit. Both a Feb56 and a 1-in-150 year event may cause 1016 
operational difficulties for airlines, since crew may have come close to, or exceeded, their annual 1017 
dose allowance. For a 1-in-1000 year event, the distribution given in Dyer et al. (2017) implies 1018 
radiation levels some 20 times Feb56, so that the doses could reach 150 milliSieverts. Even at 1019 
this level, no acute, short-term effects would occur, but those exposed would have a small 1020 
increased lifetime risk of stochastic effects, such as cancer: the threshold for acute effects is more 1021 
than an order of magnitude higher, but an individual receiving 150 milliSieverts will have an 1022 
increase of about 1% in their lifetime risk of fatal cancer.  1023 
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It is hard to estimate exactly how many people could be exposed to these levels of radiation 1024 
because it will depend on the global range and duration of the high dose rates, and whether 1025 
airlines have modified their flight patterns in response to the perceived risk. However, the 1026 
number of people exposed could exceed 10,000, with one estimate putting the number at 13,000 1027 
(Cannon et al, 2013). Experience from nuclear accidents shows that the public can be very 1028 
concerned about exposures to ionizing radiation, and at times of heightened solar activity, media 1029 
coverage has concentrated on the prospect of radiation doses; significant public concern can be 1030 
anticipated. However, at such dose levels, there would be more severe operational problems for 1031 
airlines. In addition, the SEE rates in aircraft engine and flight systems could pose a very 1032 
significant challenge to flight safety, especially as decreasing feature sizes in avionic systems 1033 
may increase vulnerability to SEEs (Cannon et al, 2013; IEC, 2017). 1034 
Many flights now reach 43,000 ft (13 km) altitude for which flux rates increase by about 30% 1035 
with respect to 40,000 ft (12 km) and executive jets reach 49,000 ft (15 km), so dose rates would 1036 
be higher in both those cases. Dose gradients with respect to altitude are very steep, for example 1037 
for Feb56 a factor 15 between 40,000 ft and 20,000 ft (6 km), and a factor 3 between 40,000 ft 1038 
and 30,000 ft (9km), at 80° North. As a result, flying at lower altitudes is highly beneficial, if 1039 
alerts can be provided in time, and Air Traffic Control is able to coordinate emergency descents 1040 
to ensure safe separation is maintained between aircraft, and that aircraft have sufficient fuel. 1041 
The dependence of neutron fluxes on altitude for several GLEs and for cosmic rays are given in 1042 
detail in Dyer et al. (2003). It should be noted that the altitude gradients vary with geomagnetic 1043 
latitude and differ somewhat between different particle species and even between the different 1044 
dosimetric quantities. For accurate assessment of the advantages of altitude and route variation, 1045 
use should be made of the detailed models available (e.g. Models for Atmospheric Ionising 1046 
Radiation Effects, MAIRE, see https://www.radmod.co.uk/maire). 1047 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has recently published the first suggested 1048 
solar radiation storm hazard levels, but recognizes that more scientific rigor and detail needs to 1049 
be brought forward to improve operational and health decisions (ICAO 2018, 2019): their 1050 
recommended threshold for severe events is 80 microSieverts h
-1
, which could be breached 1051 
during many radiation storms with hard SEP spectra (and that also produce GLEs). If this 1052 
recommended threshold is applied, the impact may be financial rather than connected to 1053 
increased risks to passengers and crew. 1054 
There is also a strong latitude gradient (for example, a factor 18 between 80° North and 51° 1055 
North, along the Greenwich meridian at 40,000 ft) and this can be exploited to reduce the 1056 
radiation hazard. However, it should be noted that if a severe geomagnetic storm is in progress 1057 
this advantage is greatly diminished because the storm reduces the ability of Earth’s 1058 
magnetosphere to deflect energetic particles, and thus enables them to reach lower latitudes than 1059 
would be possible under quiet geomagnetic conditions. An example of this reduction in 1060 
geomagnetic shielding of energetic particles was observed in flight data during the GLE of 24 1061 
October 1989 (Dyer et al., 2003 and 2007). The simultaneity of geomagnetic storms and 1062 
atmospheric radiation increases due to SEP events is probably quite common and should be 1063 
explored further. It was certainly evident for the GLEs of November 1960 and December 2006. 1064 
Indeed, for the Carrington event virtually no geomagnetic protection can be assumed, as aurorae 1065 
were seen in the tropics (Green and Boardsen, 2006). 1066 
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 1067 
5.3 Effects on Terrestrial Electronics 1068 
Sea-level ambient dose equivalent rates from a Feb56 event are low (2.5 microSieverts per hour) 1069 
even at the poles where there is no geomagnetic shielding, and even lower (0.6 microSieverts per 1070 
hour) at the latitude of the UK; these levels are of little concern. However, SEE rates could be of 1071 
concern for safety-critical systems such as nuclear power, national grid, railways and 1072 
autonomous vehicles (whether cars, ships or aircraft), particularly for 1-in-150 or 1-in-1000 year 1073 
events. The implications for ground level infrastructure have been extensively discussed in Dyer 1074 
et al. (2020). 1075 
 1076 
6 Solar Radio Burst impacts on radio systems 1077 
Here we discuss how strong signals from solar radio bursts can inject spurious signals into radio 1078 
and radar receivers, and potentially interfere with the intended signals that those receivers are 1079 
seeking to collect. This underpins RWCS section 7.8 which assesses the strength of those radio 1080 
bursts and whether they can interfere with a number of different radio technologies (e.g. GNSS, 1081 
aviation control radars, …).  1082 
The Sun has long been known to be an important source of radio noise (Hey, 1946), and can 1083 
sometimes produce intense bursts of radio noise that disrupt wireless systems. These solar radio 1084 
bursts (SRBs) are often associated with the launch of CMEs or the energisation of electrons by 1085 
plasma processes (e.g. magnetic reconnection or shocks) in the solar atmosphere (Bastian, 2010). 1086 
SRBs have the potential to affect a wide range of terrestrial and space-based radio systems. Like 1087 
D-region absorption in HF systems, SRBs reduce the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), but do so by 1088 
increasing the background noise. The level of impact is determined by the intensity and duration 1089 
of the SRB, the technical characteristics of the affected radio system, and whether the receiving 1090 
system is pointing towards the Sun. Bala et al. (2002) examined over 40 years of SRB data to 1091 
determine the duration of the events and their intensity, finding that 50% had a duration > ~12 1092 
mins and 30% had a duration > ~25 mins at frequencies above 1 GHz.  1093 







) should cause more than a 3 dB (noticeable) increase in noise at cellular 1095 
mobile base stations at dawn and dusk, when the antenna is pointing towards the Sun (at 900 1096 
MHz, assuming an antenna gain of 16 dB and a receiver noise figure of 2 dB). Bala et al. (2002) 1097 
also determined that in the period 1960-99 there were 2,882 SRB events (assuming a 12-minute 1098 
window) with an intensity >1,000 SFU, i.e. more than one per week. However, somewhat 1099 
surprisingly, there is only one published report of an SRB impact on a cellular mobile system 1100 
(Lanzerotti et al., 1999). 1101 
Moreover, no issues have been reported in the literature for the largest SRB on record, which 1102 
occurred between 19:30 and 19:40 UT on 6 December 2006, and which exhibited an intensity of 1103 
more than one million SFU. Again, adapting the equations provided by Bala et al. (2002), the 1104 
base station noise level should have increased by ~35 dB from the pre-SRB level (at 900 MHz, 1105 
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assuming antenna gain 16 dB, receiver noise figure 2 dB), and the mobile noise level should 1106 
have increased by ~14 dB (at 900 MHz, assuming an antenna gain 0 dB, noise figure 6 dB). In 1107 
the context of a base station, with its horizontally directed antennae, the absence of any recorded 1108 
issues is understandable because the Sun was not close to the horizon over any major populated 1109 
region. Mobiles though, unlike base stations, have no such constraint on solar elevation, and the 1110 
lack of any reported issues may be due to commercial sensitivity. 1111 
In contrast, the December 2006 SRB event did cause outages in the International GNSS Service 1112 
(IGS) network, WAAS and other GNSS networks (Cerruti, 2008). Those networks use semi-1113 
codeless receivers that have enabled civil access to dual-frequency GNSS measurements without 1114 
full knowledge of the pseudorandom codes embedded in GNSS signals; however those receivers 1115 
are more vulnerable to reductions in the SNR than code-tracking receivers (which have 1116 
knowledge of those codes). Carrano et al. (2009) also reported substantial degradation of 1117 
tracking and positioning by AFRL-SCINDA receivers during the 6 December SRB event, but 1118 
less significant degradation during the other less intense SRB events that same month. Mobile 1119 
satcom (UHF and L-band) operation may also be affected by SRBs. Similarly to cellular 1120 
communications the impact of SRBs is likely to be highly dependent on the design of individual 1121 
systems. No recorded impacts have been identified, but technical analysis suggests impacts are 1122 
possible for geostationary satellites around equinox, when the satellites lie close to the direction 1123 
of the Sun (at certain times of day), and for mobile systems with large beamwidths and low link 1124 
margins (Franke, 1996). 1125 
There is also practical evidence that radars monitoring air traffic can be disrupted by SRBs. This 1126 
was the basis of the early SRB impacts noted above (Hey, 1946), where SRBs interfered with 1127 
military radars. These impacts have generally been well-mitigated in recent decades, but an 1128 
incident in November 2015 showed that we need to maintain awareness of this potential impact. 1129 
During that incident, an intense SRB (around 100,000 SFU at 1 GHz) caused extensive 1130 
interference to air traffic control radars in Europe, generating many false echoes in radars in 1131 
Belgium, Estonia and Sweden, and has been discussed by Marqué et al. (2018). In Sweden, these 1132 
echoes caused the air traffic control system over the south of that country to shut down for 1133 
several hours, severely disrupting flights not just in Sweden, but also those transiting Swedish 1134 
airspace. It also prompted a major security alert, given the role of aviation as a critical 1135 
infrastructure. 1136 
In conclusion, the event on 6 December 2006 sets a lower boundary for a severe event and 1137 
consequently, our reasonable worst-case SRB intensity is set at 2 million SFU with a period of 1138 
20 minutes above this threshold. The consequence is likely to be short period degradation of 1139 
GNSS systems and some mobile cellular networks. There is also potential to disrupt air traffic 1140 
management if aviation radars are not operated with an awareness of SRBs. There is further 1141 
potential for impact on satellite communications, but this has not been demonstrated in the 1142 
course of operations. 1143 
 1144 
7 Cross-cutting issues 1145 
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As we indicated in section 1.2 many of the impacts discussed above will occur close together in 1146 
time because of the interconnections between the space weather effects that cause these impacts. 1147 
Thus it is essential to provide the users of individual RWCSs with insights into these 1148 
interconnections, so they can appreciate how adverse impacts on their activities are linked with 1149 
impacts on what appear to be very different activities.  1150 
For example, during a geomagnetic storm we may expect to see impacts that include: (a) GICs in 1151 
a range of engineered systems, (b) changes in satellite drag, (c) disruption of key radio 1152 
technologies including GNSS, HF communications, and VHF/UHF/L-band satellite links, and 1153 
(d) increased anomalies on satellites, particularly those exposed to the outer radiation belt (i.e. 1154 
geosynchronous and medium Earth orbits). So it is important to outline to RWCS users how 1155 
these diverse impacts will all arise during the course of a severe geomagnetic storm, as 1156 
magnetospheric processes interact with the ionosphere and thermosphere. Thus all the RWCSs 1157 
that arise from geomagnetic storms can occur at more or less the same time. There may some 1158 
phasing with some effects arising early in the storm and others later. But the bottom line is that 1159 
these RWCSs should be considered as an ensemble when assessing the potential impact of a 1160 
severe space weather event. They will occur close together in time with the order determined by 1161 
the sequence of events on the Sun. 1162 
A solar radiation storm will also produce a range of effects, but these will depend on the energy 1163 
of the solar energetic particles that form the storm and the location at which the effect is 1164 
experienced. We may expect to see impacts that include: (a) increased anomaly rates and 1165 
radiation damage on satellites, particularly on those in high orbits such as geosynchronous, 1166 
which are fully exposed to high energy particles coming from the Sun; and (b) a blackout of high 1167 
frequency communications in polar regions. If the storm has significant particle fluxes above 400 1168 
MeV, there will also be an atmospheric radiation storm (i.e. enhanced fluxes of energetic 1169 
neutrons), leading to (c) increased anomaly rates and some potential for damage to avionics, (d) 1170 
increased radiation doses accumulated by aircrew and passengers, perhaps giving a small 1171 
increase in lifetime risk of cancer, and (e ) enhanced rates of single event effects in electronic 1172 
systems on the ground (but no significant impact on human health). So it is equally important to 1173 
outline to RWCS users how this other set of diverse impacts will all arise close together in time, 1174 
but in this case as the result of a severe radiation storm. Thus we have a second set of RWCSs 1175 
that should be considered as an ensemble when assessing the potential impact of a severe space 1176 
weather event.  1177 
Whilst there are some overlaps between the two ensembles in that they can both disrupt satellite 1178 
operations and radio systems, it is important to recognize that there are also major differences 1179 
between the two ensembles, especially in terms of their solar-heliospheric drivers: CMEs and 1180 
SIRs/HSSs on one side, and SEPs on the other. These different physical drivers mean that the 1181 
two ensembles do not necessarily occur simultaneously and one must be cautious in making links 1182 
between the two. For example, experience shows that some users may mistakenly associate GIC 1183 
and atmospheric drag with radiation storms. Thus we need to provide clear advice that can avoid 1184 
such misunderstandings. 1185 
Nonetheless, strong solar activity leading to severe space weather is highly likely to cause both 1186 
geomagnetic and radiation storms over the course of multiple days. It is also possible (there are 1187 
examples in the 20th century observational record such as that shown in Figure 3) that major 1188 
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solar events a day or so apart can cause the simultaneous occurrence of a severe radiation storm 1189 
and a severe geomagnetic storm at Earth. In these cases, the radiation fluxes reaching the 1190 
atmosphere will be enhanced since, during geomagnetic storms, the magnetosphere is more open 1191 
to inflows of energy and particles coming from the Sun, e.g. as in a radiation storm on 24 1192 
October 1989 studied by Dyer et al., (2003).  Thus, the potential for geomagnetic and radiation 1193 
storms to occur close in time reinforces the importance of considering space weather RWCSs as 1194 
an ensemble. 1195 
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 1196 
Figure 3. A concrete example that the onset of geomagnetic and radiation storms can coincide 1197 
due to the timing of two separate bursts of solar activity. A very large geomagnetic storm started 1198 
on 12 November 1960 with a sudden commencement at 13:48 UT, indicating the arrival of a 1199 
large CME at Earth, as shown by a brief rise in the ring current index, Dst, followed by a large 1200 
decrease in Dst during the main phase of the storm. At almost exactly the same time, an intense 1201 
radiation storm started, leading to a GLE of radiation as seen here in data from ground-based 1202 
cosmic ray (CR) monitors at Climax in Colorado, and Mawson in Antarctica. (Note that the 1203 
Mawson CR counts have been increased by a factor 9 to facilitate plotting on the same scale as 1204 
Climax data; Climax is a high altitude (3,400m) site so experiences much higher cosmic ray 1205 
counts than the sea-level site at Mawson.) The radiation storm was associated with intense solar 1206 
flare and radio burst activity that was first observed around 13:20 UT the same day (NOAA, 1207 
1960). The CME launch was probably associated with solar flare activity around 03:00 UT on 1208 
the previous day, as indicated by a major blackout of HF communications in East Asia and 1209 
Australia (NOAA, 1961); no direct solar flare observations were available at that time (NOAA, 1210 
1960). The figure also shows that there was further solar activity leading to another radiation 1211 
storm on 15 November and another geomagnetic storm (dip in Dst) on 16 November. 1212 
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 1213 
8 Public behaviour 1214 
Here we assess how public behavior may respond during a severe space weather event. RWCS 1215 
section 7.17 summarises the points raised here. 1216 
In 2017, with much encouragement from Government, we started to extend the space weather 1217 
RWCSs to include an assessment of public behaviour in response to severe space weather. This 1218 
human environment cannot be characterised in the same way as the physical environments 1219 
discussed in previous sections, but is closely linked, both as a human response to the 1220 
consequences of those environments, and as a response that can be influenced by an appreciation 1221 
of scientific understanding of those environments. Therefore, we have developed a narrative 1222 
assessment as follows. 1223 
Public behaviour, particularly after a severe space weather event, is difficult to predict as the 1224 
frequency of such events does not give us a robust baseline. The 1859 Carrington Event preceded 1225 
most of our contemporary technologies and it is hence hard to draw public behaviour lessons 1226 
from this (Cliver and Svalgaard, 2004). In practice, much will depend on the scale of the event. 1227 
For example, the 1989 geomagnetic storm that caused a blackout in Quebec, closing schools and 1228 
businesses, did not result in notable public behaviour anomalies, but in this case the impact on 1229 
the electricity grid was short lived (Béland and Small, 2004). 1230 
Severe space weather is a High Impact, Low Probability event where there is little public 1231 
understanding of causes and consequences. A telephone survey of 1,010 adults in England and 1232 
Wales conducted in 2014 found that 46% of the sample had never heard of space weather and an 1233 
additional 29% had heard of it but know almost nothing about it (Sciencewise, 2015).  It has 1234 
been suggested that expectations of greater civilian activity in space might increase public 1235 
knowledge and interest in space weather (Eastwood, 2008) and so we may see knowledge 1236 
increase over time.  Scientific understanding of space phenomena can be undermined by 1237 
conspiracy theories which may propagate online through the echo chamber effects of social 1238 
media.  For example, online rumours concerning the existence of a so-called ‘Planet X’ or 1239 
‘Nibiru’, which will collide with Earth have circulated online since 1995 despite the absence of 1240 
scientific evidence (Kerr, 2011).   1241 
How the public would react to the secondary consequences of space weather, primarily its 1242 
impact on infrastructures (such as the electricity grid or telecommunications – Cannon et al., 1243 
2013) is reasonably well understood. A recent comparison (Preston et al, 2015) of international 1244 
case studies of public behaviour in infrastructure failure shows that communities will usually 1245 
react responsively and pro-socially with at least neutral, or even positive, impacts on social 1246 
cohesion.  Communities would only be expected to react negatively to official help and advice in 1247 
a space weather event (reframing) when they consider that the official response is not equitable.  1248 
For example, if power is restored to communities in a way that is perceived to be unfair then it is 1249 
likely that there will be negative political consequences that may result in demonstrations or 1250 
public disorder (Preston et al, 2015).  1251 
Space weather would result in an increased demand for essential goods and services with 1252 
associated stockpiling by consumers. Goods that are stockpiled usually include petrol, bottled 1253 
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water, canned goods and toilet paper. Stockpiling is a rational behaviour in disasters and 1254 
emergencies and is not a problem as long as retail stocks and supply chains are not 1255 
compromised. However, if people consider that stocks and supply chains may be compromised 1256 
in the future, or that they need excess supplies at home for an anticipated event, this may 1257 
increase demand to the extent that it outstrips supply. This can become a self-fulfilling prophecy 1258 
as in the COVID-19 pandemic when in March 2020 many supermarkets were experiencing 1259 
shortages. Fear of shortages leads to stockpiling which in turn leads to shortages that exacerbate 1260 
demand through (so called) ‘panic buying’ (which is a misnomer for the rational purchasing 1261 
behaviour that actually occurs, see Drury et al., 2013) resulting in further shortages. Prices may 1262 
rise rapidly, queuing may occur, stocks can be depleted and (rarely) some individuals may resort 1263 
to theft to obtain supplies.  Supply chains in the UK are lean (i.e. little stock is held) and are 1264 
particularly vulnerable to excessive buying in a crisis (House of Lords Scientific Committee, 1265 
2005).  We may therefore expect consumer behaviour to be self-reinforcing if there are media 1266 
reports of queues or shortages following (or just before) a space weather event.   1267 
We know very little about how the specific context of a space weather event (the fact that it 1268 
emerges from space) might impact on public behaviour. There may be something unusual about 1269 
the context of space weather, as 35% of respondents in the Sciencewise (2015) study would be 1270 
more concerned about a power cut in their area caused by space weather when compared to other 1271 
causes. Unlike an accidental event, or malicious attack, some fringe groups might consider that 1272 
there is a particularly apocalyptic message behind a space weather event.  At the extremes, this 1273 
may lead to unusual forms of behaviour. Millenarianism refers a view of certain religious sects, 1274 
or individuals, who consider that certain events are a sign that the world is coming to an end.  1275 
These events are often linked to space events such as comets (McBeath, 2011) and pseudo-1276 
scientific concepts such as changes in ‘galactic alignment’ or cataclysmic ‘pole shifts’.  1277 
Sometimes religious cults use space events as a justification for mass suicides or violent events. 1278 
For example, the 1999 suicide of 31 members of the ‘Heaven’s Gate’ cult in San Diego, 1279 
California was planned after their observations of the Hale-Bopp comet in 1997 (the cult 1280 
believed a spacecraft trailing the comet would take them from Earth). Fifty-three members of 1281 
The Order of the Solar Temple, who worship the Sun, died in Switzerland in 1994 (Palmer, 1282 
2016). There is a distinction between these cults as ‘Heaven’s Gate’ were motivated by a specific 1283 
space event whereas The Order of the Solar Temple were more generally motivated by recurrent 1284 
events such as the solstice. Many of these deaths were not necessarily suicide and resulted from 1285 
the murder of their own members. Such events are extreme and difficult to predict but may 1286 
coincide with a solar event such as severe space weather. We would highlight the specific 1287 
‘space’ focus of many contemporary cults, and conspiracy theorists, as an area of concern during 1288 
a space weather event. 1289 
8.1 Anxiety  1290 
The UK National Risk Assessment (Cabinet Office, 2017) recognizes that one key element in the 1291 
impacts of natural hazards is the psychological impact on the wider population, including 1292 
widespread anxiety. Anxiety is an important psychological impact as it can impose large costs on 1293 
society and the economy, in particular through lost employment, but also through the costs of 1294 
treating anxiety (McCrone et al., 2008). Anxiety is likely to arise during severe space weather 1295 
through several mechanisms, in particular loss of electric power. This is supported by the 1296 
Sciencewise (2015) public dialogue study discussed above; during this study the public response 1297 
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always focused back on loss of electric power as the primary concern. There was a clear 1298 
recognition by members of the general public that their lives would be severely disrupted by loss 1299 
of this technology, much more so than loss of GNSS or even aviation radiation risks. The 1300 
Sciencewise study also highlighted that the public recognized the value of good honest advice in 1301 
dealing with the impacts of space weather. The risk of anxiety during a severe space weather 1302 
event can be reduced by providing good transparent information, and where feasible, engaging in 1303 
dialogue. Conversely, it can be magnified by poor information, whether overly optimistic or 1304 
overly pessimistic, and, perhaps even worse, by a lack of information. 1305 
 1306 
9 Discussion 1307 
Severe space weather was formally recognised as a significant natural hazard in the UK in 2011, 1308 
because scientific evidence, as outlined here, showed that severe space weather conditions are to 1309 
be expected on similar timescales to extremes of other natural hazards considered in the UK 1310 
National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 2017). This was strongly complemented by engineering 1311 
assessments that demonstrated that the operation of many critical national infrastructures might 1312 
be disrupted in these severe space weather conditions (Cannon et al., 2013). The recognition of 1313 
space weather as a significant risk was reinforced by the uncertainties noted in both sets of 1314 
evidence, i.e. these uncertainties were recognised as a further risk factor.  1315 
Since that time, there has been significant progress in resolving some of those uncertainties, as 1316 
shown by many of the post-2011 references cited in this paper. A prime example is progress in 1317 
understanding the size and likelihood of very intense atmospheric radiation storms following the 1318 
detection of cosmogenic isotope signatures of several such storms over the past 3000 years 1319 
(Miyake et al.,2012; Mekhaldi et al., 2015; O’Hare et al, 2019). These new data have helped to 1320 
put the limited observational record (~80 years) in a longer-term context, giving better insights 1321 
into the centennial timescale risk from atmospheric radiation storms (Dyer et al., 2017; Dyer et 1322 
al., 2020). Another important example is in better understanding the nature of the risk posed by 1323 
GICs: (a) the importance of ground and sea conductivity in creating the geoelectric fields that 1324 
drive these currents (Kelly et al., 2017; Pulkkinen et al., 2017); (b) that the large geomagnetic 1325 
variations (dBH/dt) that create the most intense geoelectric fields can often occur as short bursts, 1326 
sometimes with limited (a few hundred km) spatial extent (Cid et al., 2015; Ngwira et al., 2015; 1327 
Pulkkinen et al., 2015; Opgenoorth et al., 2020); and (c) that large geomagnetic storms will 1328 
generate multiple instances of such bursts, generally at different locations, and at different times 1329 
within the storm (e.g. Boteler, 2019; Eastwood et al., 2018; Hapgood, 2019a; Oughton et al, 1330 
2019). This better understanding has the potential to enable improved modelling and forecasting 1331 
of the impacts of large GICs on all electrically-grounded infrastructures.  1332 
These are just two examples of improved understanding of space weather environments. Other 1333 
examples include better assessment of charged particle environments in space, through the 1334 
provision of better quality data and through the use of extreme value statistics. But there remains 1335 
much scope for further improvement in all these areas, e.g. to exploit newly exposed data on 1336 
historical events such the 1770 geomagnetic storm (Hayakawa et al., 2017) and the ~660 BCE 1337 
radiation storm (O’Hare et al., 2019), as well as deeper analyses of existing datasets. Another 1338 
important area for future work is to understand better the physics at work in extreme space 1339 
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weather conditions, e.g. a highly compressed magnetosphere as during the August 1972 storm 1340 
(Knipp et al., 2018) and to incorporate that knowledge in models of severe space weather. This 1341 
approach mirrors work to simulate extreme tropospheric weather such as hurricanes (Smith, 1342 
2006) and has the potential to simulate future events that human societies may otherwise have to 1343 
wait decades or even centuries to experience (Hapgood, 2011). 1344 
The need for improved understanding of space weather is recognized by UK funding bodies, as 1345 
demonstrated by recent support for a wide range of research projects in key areas such as GICs, 1346 
radiation effects on satellites and on ground-based infrastructures. A very recent major step 1347 
forward was the September 2019 announcement of £20 million funding for the Space Weather 1348 
Instrumentation, Measurement, Modelling and Risk (SWIMMR) project 1349 
(https://www.ralspace.stfc.ac.uk/Pages/SWIMMR.aspx). This will support a range of projects, 1350 
with an emphasis on work that transitions space weather models into operations and develops 1351 
new UK space-weather monitoring capabilities that will feed data into those operations. It is 1352 
important to recognise that the need for improved understanding is not limited to the refinement 1353 
of existing evidence. Our society’s vulnerability to space weather is ultimately driven by our 1354 
growing dependence on advanced technologies to deliver services used in everyday life 1355 
(Hapgood, 2019b). Thus we need to monitor emerging technologies to understand whether they 1356 
are vulnerable to space weather and, if so, to determine what extreme environments they will 1357 
encounter. A prime example today is the development of autonomous vehicles (cars, ships and 1358 
aircraft) where GNSS is an important (but not sole) element in vehicle navigation, and hence 1359 
there is a potential space weather vulnerability arising from ionospheric impacts on GNSS. This 1360 
need to monitor emerging technologies is complemented by a need to maintain awareness of 1361 
space weather as existing technologies are refined, lest new vulnerabilities are inadvertently 1362 
created. A modern example of this issue is the November 2015 disruption of air traffic in 1363 
Northern Europe, when a large solar radio burst generated large number of false signals in radar 1364 
systems in Belgium, Estonia and Sweden (Marqué et al., 2018). The potential for radar 1365 
interference from the Sun has been known for over 70 years (Hey, 1946) but was clearly missed 1366 
in this case, so the lesson was re-learned the hard way. As a result, we have included the risk of 1367 
radar interference in our set of reasonable worst-case scenarios. It is a risk that is generally well-1368 
mitigated, but does need to be included in our scenarios so as to support that mitigation. 1369 
Moving away from individual risk factors, we must recognize that these impacts on different 1370 
technologies will occur close together in time, most obviously as a magnetically-complex active 1371 
region crosses the face of the Sun as seen from Earth (as happened in major past events such as 1372 
that of March 1989). Thus the range of adverse space weather environments, as discussed in 1373 
Sections 2 to 6, need to be considered both individually (for their impacts on specific 1374 
technologies) and as an ensemble that will all occur during a future major event, as we note in 1375 
Section 7.  It is this ensemble that will disrupt a diverse host of societally-vital infrastructures 1376 
including energy, communications and transport. Thus it is important to provide policy-makers 1377 
with cross-cutting scenarios, such as that in Cannon et al. (2013), that highlights such ensembles. 1378 
Another cross-cutting issue that we have considered is public behaviour, i.e. to consider how 1379 
people may respond when a severe space weather event next occurs. This is recognised by the 1380 
UK Government as an important element of the wider environment within which major risks 1381 
affect society. We have therefore included this is our assessment, taking account of studies that 1382 
have explored how the public can engage with space weather (Sciencewise, 2015), and also of 1383 
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wider studies on the public behaviour in response to unusual but stressful events. These make it 1384 
clear that the public value good, honest and transparent advice from experts and Government, 1385 
and that this can reduce the anxiety that naturally arises when people face serious risks. 1386 
However, further work is needed to explore how best to provide that advice, recognizing that for 1387 
severe space weather, communications may be disrupted. We anticipate that this will become an 1388 
important area for future work, given that the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic is likely to stimulate a 1389 
wider focus on the communication of information about societal risks and their impacts on 1390 
everyday life. It will be important to understand where space weather can have similar societal 1391 
impacts to those seen during this pandemic, e.g. the disruption of supply chains for some 1392 
products, and also to understand where space weather can have opposite societal impacts. For 1393 
example, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to greater use of cashless transactions, but severe 1394 
space weather is likely to disrupt electronic payments systems (Haug, 2010), thus driving a 1395 
switch back to cash. 1396 
In summary, this paper outlines how we have developed a set of reasonable worst-case space 1397 
weather scenarios that can assist UK policy-makers in planning for the impact of severe space 1398 
weather on our country. We provide both specific scenarios for a wide range of critical 1399 
technologies, and cross-cutting views of how these scenarios could combine to create greater risk 1400 
during a severe space weather event. We also consider public behaviour in response to 1401 
information about an event and note that good messaging is critical to helping people to deal 1402 
with the stress that will naturally arise. 1403 
Finally, whilst the target for these scenarios is the UK, we note that they contain many ideas that 1404 
may be of assistance to other countries. We welcome and encourage productive dialogue with 1405 
other countries, and recognize the valuable role of international discussions that have already 1406 
occurred, e.g. support for the development of the US Space Weather Benchmarks (National 1407 
Science and Technology Council, 2018; Reeves et al. 2019). 1408 
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